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ABSTRACT
A STUDY OF RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR 
IN INVESTMENT BANKING
Elzotbek Rustambekov, Doctor of Philosophy, 2012 
Old Dominion University, 2012 
Dissertation Directed by: Dr. Anil Nair,
Dr. Michael McShane and Dr. David Selover.
Department o f Management 
College of Business and Public Administration
This dissertation examines corporate risk-taking behavior by investment banks in 
the United States. This study was sparked by the collapse o f Lehman Brothers, one of 
the largest bankruptcy filings in U.S. history. This dissertation examines the specific 
factors that drove investment banks such as Lehman Brothers to take excessive risks, and 
how the deregulation of the US financial services industry towards the end of the 1990s 
contributed to risk-taking behavior.
I use four theoretical perspectives to examine corporate risk-taking behavior 
among investment banks. These perspectives include: institutional theory, behavioral 
theory of the firm, knowledge based view (KBV) of the firm, and agency theory. Risk 
research in strategic management has mostly tended to adopt three theoretical 
perspectives: behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963), prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). I included 
institutional theory and KBV perspectives because numerous studies suggest that the 
regulatory environment (Scott, 2003) and knowledge base of a firm (Grant, 1996b)
matters in corporate risk-taking. A review o f the practitioner literature also suggests that 
regulatory frameworks and lack of firm competence have played a role in firm risk-taking 
behavior (Pirson & Turnbull, 2011; Summers, 2011; Wallison, 2011).
My analysis suggests that both external and internal factors were associated with 
excessive corporate risk-taking among investment banks. External factors associated with 
firm risk-taking include the institutional environment, such as regulation (or absence 
thereof). Internal factors associated with firm risk-taking include aspirations of 
executives, level of corporate diversification, knowledge base of company, number of 
interlocking directorships in the board, size o f the board, ratio of insiders to outsiders on 
the board, and ownership of the stock by board members of investment banks.
The findings of this study contribute to the literature on corporate risk-taking 
behavior, and suggest that the study of such a complex phenomenon as corporate-risk 
taking needs to be done using multiple theoretical perspectives.
This dissertation is dedicated to my mother for all her support 
and for instilling in me that learning is truly a lifelong process.
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A STUDY OF RISK BEHAVIOR 
IN INVESTMENT BANKING
1 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation analyzes the antecedents of corporate risk-taking and answers 
the question: what factors contribute to corporate risk-taking? Specifically it looks at how 
four sets of factors, including: (1) institutional and industry variables, (2) company’s 
aspirations, (3) firm’s knowledge, and (4) corporate governance, contribute to corporate 
risk-taking (Please see Appendix A). It is established in the literature that all four sets of 
factors influence corporate risk-taking, yet there is no study that analyzes these factors at 
once and shows which factors have a stronger effect on risk strategies. While considering 
all four sets of factors, this dissertation analyzes competing theoretical perspectives on 
risk, including institutional theory, knowledge-based view, behavioral theory of the firm 
and agency theory. In the face of the current financial crisis, the importance of corporate 
risk-taking cannot be overstated; one of the main implications of this research is that any 
analysis o f corporate risk-taking should be performed on a holistic manner using 
multilayered levels of analysis.
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Corporate risk embodies a multitude of policy decisions that are made separately 
as a reaction to different industry and firm factors that have unbalanced effects on 
corporate performance, and possibly, corporate survival (Reger, Duhaime, & Stimpert, 
1992). Institutional variables include presence or absence o f various regulations as well 
as the number of agencies overlooking particular sectors of the economy, and it is 
established that changes in regulations result in change in corporate risk levels (Wiseman 
& Catanach Jr, 1997). The connection between regulations and corporate risk was 
established not only in the United States, but across the world, including in Central and 
Eastern European countries (Agoraki, Delis, & Pasiouras, 2009). Regulations such as 
capital requirements, bank activity restrictions, and boundaries o f supervisory power 
have an independent influence on risk-taking in the banking sector, and that influence is 
separate from any market power effects of regulatory changes (Agoraki et al., 2009). 
Therefore, institutional environment clearly influences corporate risk-taking, and that is 
why it is selected as one of the main factors in the analysis.
The behavioral theory of the firm combines companies’ aspirations, performance 
levels and corporate risk (Bromiley, 1991; Cyert & March, 1963). When performance 
levels exceed aspirations, companies keep their established routines, as there is no need 
to change the system that performs well (Augier & Prietula, 2007). Otherwise, when 
performance levels fall below aspirations, companies search for new ways to operate, 
because what they are doing is not working (Augier & Prietula, 2007). The difference 
between aspirations and actual performance is called attainment discrepancy (Lant, 
1992). The higher this discrepancy is, the larger the company’s pressure to take risk 
(Bromiley, 1991). Aspirations can be measured in two ways: (1) as company’s past
3
performance, and (2) as company’s peer groups’ performance (Cyert & March, 1963), 
and both of those will be measured in this dissertation.
The resource-based view argues that a valuable, rare, inimitable and 
nonsubstitutable set of resources provides a sustained competitive advantage for a 
company (Barney, 1986b, 1991, 2001). Resources not only provide competitive 
advantage, but also influence corporate risk-taking (Wang, Barney, & Reuer, 2003). In 
turn, particular corporate risk-taking practices send a positive signal to the market and 
can attract more resources in the form of investment to the company (Wang et al., 2003). 
Corporate resources consist of various productive systems, including physical capital, 
legal capital, intangible assets and human talent (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). In human 
talent Mahoney and Pandian (1992) include top management teams as a crucial resource 
that generates rent. Das and Teng (1998) divided resources into four categories, 
including: financial, technological, physical and managerial, and showed an interactive 
effect of resources with risk (Das & Teng, 1998). Managerial resources include 
knowledge and expertise, and they will be analyzed using knowledge-based view of the 
firm, which is an extension of resource-based view (Felin & Hesterly, 2007). Knowledge- 
based view argues that the key to any company’s success lies in its ability to integrate 
various types of knowledge and apply it to new problems, products and services (Grant, 
1996b). Knowledge-based view puts forward the idea that a company’s success and 
survival depend on its ability to combine, generate and apply relevant knowledge 
(Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1993, 1996). Hierarchical organizations are 
particularly good at combining, sorting and applying knowledge, thus developing “path 
dependent” capabilities and intellectual assets (Athanassiades, 1973).
The relationship between corporate governance and corporate risk-taking is well 
established (Eling & Marek, 2011; John, Litov, & Yeung, 2008). Variations o f corporate 
governance systems across countries, like the market-based corporate governance system 
of the U.K. and the control-based corporate governance system o f Germany, produce 
variations in corporate risk-taking, and evidence of this is well established (Eling & 
Marek, 2011). Corporate risk-taking choices are partly determined by managers’ explicit 
ownership of a company and various compensation schemes, such as stock-ownership, 
by top management teams (John et al., 2008). Other things that determine corporate risk- 
taking are board members’ behavior, access to relevant information and ability to process 
knowledge (Pirson & Turnbull, 2011) as well as presence and scope o f responsibilities of 
audit and risk management committees (Brown, Steen, & Foreman, 2009). All this 
evidence suggests that differences in corporate governance systems between companies 
and across nations clearly influence corporate risk-taking. In this dissertation, additional 
factors such as interlocking directorships and the number o f independent directors on the 
board will be examined.
Four sets of factors contribute to corporate risk-taking, including: 
(1) institutional and industry variables, (2) firm aspirations that are based on past 
performance and industry average, (3) specific resources and a particular type of resource 
-  knowledge, and (4) corporate governance. The strength of these factors could vary 
across situations, but in order to have a clear picture of how to stimulate effective risk 
management systems in corporations it is crucial to look at all four sets o f factors 
simultaneously. This simultaneous view allows us to see the interactions, and the
analysis of factors related to agency theory permits us to rank board of directors 
parameters by their strength of influence.
This dissertation’s results are of interest not only to academia, but to the world of 
practitioners, because they give managers information on how the external environment 
and internal factors, including governance mechanisms, influence risk-taking of 
companies, and what role knowledge base plays. Government and regulatory bodies can 
benefit from this research because their role as rule setters is covered under the 
institutional and industry levels o f analysis.
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL MODEL 
2.1 Risk, Measures of Risk and Strategy
Risk has been the focus of much theoretical and practical research for decades. 
Both executives and academics have tried to develop practical concepts and techniques 
for assessing risk. Singhvi (1980) notes that “risk, like beauty, lies in the eyes of the 
beholder,” which means that under similar internal and external circumstances, various 
people and companies draw different risk pictures.
One of the first to make the distinction between risk and uncertainty in economic 
terms was Knight (1921), who argues that “certainty” takes place when decision 
outcomes can have finite probabilities, like one or zero. “Risk,” therefore, is defined as 
the probability distribution of all the existing outcomes that can be projected when 
probabilities shift from zero to one. When probability distribution cannot be estimated 
“risk” turns into “uncertainty” (Knight, 1921). While very logical, Knight’s definition 
and argument have not been widely accepted by researchers in economics and other 
fields, such as psychology, that study organizations (Bromiley & Johnson, 2005). The 
muddle around risk and uncertainty was well noted by Bettis (1982) who said: 
“Technically, there is a distinction between risk and uncertainty... Almost all authors 
after noting this distinction ignore it and use risk and uncertainty interchangeably.” Not 
only do different fields that study organizations have different views on risk, but
practitioners also understand risk in a fashion contrary to Knight (Baird & Thomas, 1990; 
March & Shapira, 1987). For instance, for managers risk seems to be more of a downside 
concept -  specified in terms of failure to perform at a given level. Downside is more 
relevant to practicing managers than performance variability, which includes both upside 
and downside outcomes (Miller & Reuer, 1996). Singhvi (1980) defined risk as “the 
estimated degree of uncertainty with respect to realization of the expected return or 
outcome.” This description of risk includes approximations of uncertainty as typically 
defined (Nohria & Stewart, 2006).
2.1.1 Risk and Performance Relationship
Risk is a multi-dimensional concept, and it leads to various perspectives on what 
risk-taking is. For example, in the literature risk may include financial leverage1 of the 
company (Combs & Ketchen Jr, 1999; Gale, 1972; Hall & Weiss, 1967), level of 
corporate diversification (Jensen, 1989; Lang & Stulz, 1993; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 
1989), variability of the income stream (Haurin, 1991; Miller & Bromiley, 1990), and 
perceptions of top executives (Miller & Friesen, 1986; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995; Weber, 
Blais, & Betz, 2002).
In the strategic management discipline, seminal study is the work o f Bowman 
(1980) who found a negative relationship between risk and return. This relationship was 
particularly strong for companies with below-average performance. Labeled as
1 Also called Debt-to-Equity ratio and denoted D/E
"risk/return paradox," this finding was contrary to the positive risk-return relation that 
was established in the field of finance for decades. As a proxy for risk, Bowman 
employed the variance of the retum-on-equity (ROE) from annual reports. Bowman's 
(1980) explanations for the risk/return paradox include: (1) variations in managerial 
talent enabled companies with high-quality management teams to consistently have both 
higher performance and lower risk, as compared to companies with management teams of 
lower quality; (2) the pattern o f investment decisions o f some companies reflected more 
risk-seeking than risk-avoiding decisions; (3) companies with lower profitability assumed 
risks that companies with higher profitability avoided altogether; (4) market dominance 
of a company seems to permit both higher profits and lower risk levels.
Most studies in the field o f finance found a positive relationship between risk 
levels and performance (Aaker & Jacobson, 1987; Cardozo & Smith, 1983; Jegers, 1991). 
Using PIMS database, Aaker and Jacobson (1987) established a positive association 
between performance and both systematic and unsystematic risks. Risks in that study 
were defined using accounting data.
Some studies found no relationship between risk and performance (Bettis & 
Mahajan, 1985). For instance, variance in returns, average returns and risk had 
associations that changed over time (Figenbaum & Thomas, 1986). Relationship between 
systematic risk of the company's stock returns and the stock market, which is generally 
known as beta, and returns measured via accounting tools had no association 
(Figenbaum & Thomas, 1986).
2 After-tax profit divided by stockholder's equity
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Literature suggests that risk is a multidimensional concept and should be regarded 
as such (Haimes, 2009; Resek, 1970). The multidimensional nature o f risk implies that 
there are a number of factors that affect corporate levels of risk. For example, on the firm 
level, if one applies the view that a firm is a coalition (Cyert & March, 1963), also called 
relevant stakeholders view (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), it becomes clear that various risk 
dimensions reflect the multitudes of interests of coalition members. Differences in risk 
dimensions have bearings on performance; for instance, income stream uncertainty 
negatively influences corporate performance (Bromiley, 1991; Miller & Bromiley, 1990; 
Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996), while downside risk positively influences subsequent 
corporate performance (Miller & Leiblein, 1996a). Many constructs from the behavioral 
theory of the firm affect corporate risk levels. For example, risk-taking is increased if 
corporate performance is below the aspirations levels, and there is a strong positive 
relationship between these constructs, i.e. the larger the gap between corporate 
performance and aspirations, the higher the risk-taking will be. Interestingly, 
organizational slack generally reduces risk-taking tendencies (Moses, 1992; Singh, 1986; 
Su, Xie, & Li, 2009). In accordance with predictions of agency theory, strong corporate 
governance systems appear to mitigate risk-aversion of managers, whereas, the general 




A Global Survey of Economist Intelligence Unit questioned 334 financial 
services executives, and 60% of respondents said that the importance o f risk management 
was not understood throughout their organization (Stringer, 2009). Two thirds are no 
longer confident that policy makers can produce an adequate and effective response to 
the economic meltdown. Respondents pronounced that risk management reform within 
institutions would have to be far-reaching and radical. The survey results show the 
magnitude of the current problem, and it is especially interesting in light o f the research 
findings that risk management is regarded as one of the most important goals of financial 
executives (Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1993). From this perspective the global financial 
crisis can be viewed as a malfunction within an institutional environment, because risk 
was ignored industry-wide (Johnson & Kwak, 2010). Many key players o f the market 
that constitute the fabric of the institutional environment, such as regulators — including 
Securities and Exchange Commission, government bodies -  including Federal Reserve 
and Treasury, credit rating agencies -  including Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch, 
were either unaware of risks or were passive in their roles in preventing unrealistic risk 
exposures (Lucchetti, Scannell, & Shah, 2008).
Going back to the example o f global financial crisis, and looking at it on a 
company level, it becomes apparent that risk management practices within companies 
emphasized short-term rates of return over long-term risk-adjusted return (McDonald,
3 From <http://mikhailfedorov.wordpress.com/2009/f0/03/after-the-storm-a-new-era-for-risk- 
management-in-financial-services/> [Accessed 02.19.2011 at 19:34]
2009). For instance, many financial institutions that made a decision to take part in 
securitization of mortgages, trading in derivatives and collaterized debt obligations4 
ended up going bankrupt or accessed TARM funds (Lo, 2009). Also company level 
analysis demonstrates that during this financial crisis different financial institutions were 
affected differently (Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010). This difference in effect is due to 
variations in risk management techniques that are at the project and company levels 
(Bartlett, 2004; Chapman & Ward, 2002). Risk management on a company level consists 
of three main phases: (1) risk identification, (2) risk assessment and (3) management of 
risk (Leitch, 2009; Singhal & Singhal, 2009). Risk identification includes source analysis 
and problem analysis (Pritchard, 2010). Risk assessment consists o f impact analysis and 
probability of the risk analysis (Pritchard, 2010). Management of risk includes four main 
strategies: (1) risk avoidance, also called elimination, (2) risk reduction or mitigation, (3) 
risk transfer, which includes outsourcing or using insurance, and (4) risk acceptance, 
which leads to retention and budgeting. If the company chooses retention, it should set up 
a contingency for it. (Ranasinghe, 1994; Touran, 2003; Yeo, 1990). How much that 
contingency should be linked to a company’s resource base still remains under debate 
(Cioffi & Khamooshi, 2008a). Some scholars argue that contingency budgeting is 
perceived as a waste of resources (Pate-Comeli & Dillon, 2001); others suggest that a 
company should assign a fixed percentage of total costs as contingency (Yeo, 1990). 
Application of fixed percentages has been criticized for being inexact in giving the 
amounts needed should risk materialize (Touran, 2003). Yeo (1990) showed that an 
arbitrary 10%, 20%, or 30% is usually set aside and suggested using the contingency-
4 Sometimes called CDOs
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estimating system concept. This concept combines aspects of the conventional “classes of 
estimate” approach with a statistical method, uses range estimates and applies the theory 
of probability for risk assessment and contingency estimation. A newer scientific method 
suggests finding optimal contingency allocation using models which take into account 
total number of risks and severity and probability of each risk (Cioffi & Khamooshi, 
2008b; Khamooshi & Cioffi, 2009). This method has an advantage of allowing financial 
managers to allocate the optimal level of contingency when accepting risks. This 
evidence suggests that in order to understand the nature and effects of risk, one should 
look not only at institutional variables, but at company level variables as well.
2.1.3 Measures o f Risk
When it comes to the measurement of risk, a variety o f risk proxies are used. The 
most common risk proxies are variability o f accounting returns over time, such as retum- 
on-assets (ROA) and retum-on-equity (Bromiley, Miller, & Rau, 2001). The majority of 
measures are the results of (1) availability o f data, (2) simplicity of computation, and (3) 
instances of past usage in other disciplines (Bromiley et al., 2001).
As a measure of risk, most studies that followed the research direction of using 
the variance of the retum-on-equity (Bowman, 1982; 1980; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 
1985) employed standard deviation of the retum-on-equity (Baucus, Golec, & Cooper, 
1993; Gooding, Goel, & Wiseman, 1996; Jegers, 1991), variance of the retum-on-equity
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(Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; Jegers, 1991), variance of the retum-on-equity around the 
time trend (Oviatt & Bauerschmidt, 1991), adjusted variance of the retum-on-equity 
(Marsh & Swanson, 1984), standard deviation of the retum-on-assets (Baucus et al., 
1993; Cool, Dierickx, & Jemison, 1989; Jemison, 1987), variance of the retum-on-assets 
(Fiegenbaum, 1990; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1990; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999), standard 
deviation of the retum-on-sales (Cool et al., 1989), and the standard deviation o f the 
annual percentage change in earnings (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993). To overcome 
concerns about the measurement quality of standard deviation and variance, several 
researchers introduced distinctive measures based on accounting returns, including an 
adjusted risk measure for autocorrelation within firms over time (Marsh & Swanson, 
1984), the sum of absolute deviations around each firm's average retum-on-equity over 
four years (Woo, 1987), the estimation of accounting betas by fitting accountings-return 
data to the capital asset pricing model (Aaker & Jacobson, 1987), returns variability 
around a time trend (Oviatt & Bauerschmidt, 1991; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1991), the 
standard deviation of annual percentage changes in earnings (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993), 
and the mean-quadratic-differences over a five-year time slot and the variance of retum- 
on-equity around the median (Lehner, 2000).
When the stock market data is available, the most common tools that researchers 
use to account for risk are the estimates of systematic and unsystematic risk from the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964; Treynor, 1961, 1962). Systematic 
and unsystematic risks capture risk from the perspective of stock-owners. Other common 
measures of risk derived from the Capital Asset Pricing Model are: accounting beta using 
retum-on-equity (Aaker & Jacobson, 1987) and Jensen's beta for estimation of
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unsystematic risk (Amit & Wemerfelt, 1990). Scholars in strategic management 
questioned the meaningfulness of the Capital Asset Pricing Model's risk measures and 
implications of those measures (Bromiley et al., 2001). For instance, contrary to the 
predictions of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, general managers do try to minimize 
unsystematic risk (Bettis, 1983). The relevance o f Beta for the strategic management field 
was challenged and criticized on the grounds o f small empirical support for CAPM 
(Chatterjee, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 1999; Ruefli, Collins, & Lacugna, 1999).
Additional interesting measures of risk include: annual report content analysis 
(Bowman, 1984), standard deviation of EPS forecast (Bromiley, 1991; Deephouse & 
Wiseman, 2000; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996), Beta Altman's 
Z (D'Aveni & Ilinitch, 1992), and entropy measure derived from shifting rank within an 
industry (Collins & Ruefli, 1992).
To account for the multidimensional nature of risk several researchers used more 
than two risk measures at once. For example, Woo (1987) used the sum of absolute 
deviation around average retum-on-equity, variability in market share around time trend, 
and price-cost gap. Cool and Schendel (1987) measured risk with standard deviation of 
market share, weighted segment share and retum-on-sales, absolute value o f percentage 
change from average past retum-on-equity, retum-on-assets, current ratio, and sales to 
total assets. Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) employed absolute value of percentage 
change from average past retum-on-equity, retum-on-assets, current ratio, and sales to 
total assets, standard deviation of retum-on-assets, standard deviation of retum-on-equity, 
standard deviation of analysts' eamings-per-share forecasts, and coefficient o f variation 
of analysts' eamings-per-share forecasts. Miller and Bromiley (1990) simultaneously
used beta, unsystematic risk, debt-to-equity ratio, capital intensity and R&D intensity. 
Wiseman and Bromiley (1991) utilized variance in retum-on-equity and variance in 
retum-on-assets, variance in retum-on-equity and variance in retum-on-assets around a 
time trend, RLPM using stock returns, RLPM using retum-on-assets and retum-on- 
equity, downside beta, probability of falling below industry average earnings to price 
ratio and retum-on-assets. Miller and Reuer (1996) applied standard deviation of retum- 
on-assets, retum-on-equity Beta, unsystematic risk, coefficient of variation of forecasted 
eamings-per-share, and Altman's Z. Miller and Leiblein (1996a) employed RLPM based 
on retum-on-assets, standard deviation of retum-on-assets, standard deviation around 
retum-on-assets trend, and absolute value of year-to-year change in retum-on-equity. 
Lehner (2000) employed mean of quadratic difference in retum-on-equity and variance of 
retum-on-equity around the median. Reuer and Leiblein (2000) used RLPM using retum- 
on-assets, retum-on-equity and downside beta.
2.2 Deregulation
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Starting in the late 1970s many nations including the United States substantially 
liberalized key parameters o f their banking regulations (Feldmann, 2012). More 
deregulations followed in the 2000s, leading the banking sector to a situation where it is 
largely stripped of most restrictions, some of which had been in place for many decades 
(Feldmann, 2012). A few examples of deregulations include elimination of controls of 
interest rates, removal of barriers to entry for foreign banks, decrease in state ownership 
and loans issued for political reasons with lower than market rates to specific sectors of 
the economy (Feldmann, 2012; Fuentelsaz, Gomez, & Polo, 2002).
The question of the effects of deregulation is important because o f its long term 
and far reaching effects and, even more so, because of the global financial crisis o f 2007- 
2009. As a result of this crisis, which increased unemployment around the world and in 
the United States, banking regulation has been reviewed and substantially tightened 
(Ashcraft & Adrian, 2012). Most literature on deregulation is in support of deregulatory 
initiatives. Let us review some of the main reasons for supporting deregulations.
2.2.1 Deregulation and Economic Growth
Deregulation is linked directly to economic growth. The removal o f bank branch 
restrictions in the United States was a good setting to examine the relationship (Jayaratne
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& Strahan, 1996). Evidence suggested that rates of per capita income growth and 
aggregate output amplified significantly right after intrastate branch deregulation 
(Jayaratne & Strahan, 1996). Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) argue that the improvement in 
economic growth can only be attributed to deregulation o f the banking system and 
nothing else. Economic growth follows enhancements in the quality of bank lending, but 
not enhancement of the volume of lending, and this effect brings fast economic growth 
(Jayaratne & Strahan, 1996).
There are many more studies providing evidence that more pro-competitive 
banking regulation leads to a more efficient banking sector (Fu & Heffeman, 2007; 
Hasan & Marton, 2003; Huang, 2000). Privatization is the first of the regulations that are 
considered to be pro-competitive and to increase the efficiency of banks (Beck, Cull, & 
Jerome, 2005; Berger, Hasan, & Zhou, 2009; Bhaumik & Dimova, 2004; Bonaccorsi di 
Patti & Hardy, 2005; Hasan & Marton, 2003), while regulations allowing easier entry for 
foreign banks follow closely in second place (Figueira, Nellis, & Parker, 2009; Li, 2008).
Empirical analysis of financial deregulation in Bangladesh from 1975 to 1995 
provides evidence for the theory of endogenous growth (Siddiki, 2002). Siddiki (2002) 
argues that financial deregulation, accompanied by investments in human capital, 
improves the growth rate of the economy, thus building the case for deregulation of 
financial sectors. The study utilized variations o f time series techniques, and results were 
very stable across a multitude of methodologies (Siddiki, 2002).
Mixed results of deregulation on economic growth were shown in the example of 
the airline industry in the United States (Winston, 1998). Deregulation o f airlines started
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in 1974, and was completed in nine years, with elimination of control on fares, control on 
entries and control on exits of airlines. Winston (1998) argues that even 20 years after 
deregulation, airlines show massive inefficiencies and employ practices that would have 
been illegal under strict regulations of fares. Thus, deregulated or partially deregulated 
industries may not achieve immediate efficiencies and instead may continue operating in 
Pareto sub-optimal ways (Winston, 1998).
Policymakers are pressured to deliver economic growth, which means that if 
deregulation does not produce immediate results, policymakers tend to reverse 
deregulation, and reregulate or block any future deregulation (Stiroh & Strahan, 2003). 
For instance, cable television was deregulated by Congress in 1984 and then reregulated 
in 1992: this shift from deregulation to reregulation resulted in a decrease in consumer 
welfare (Crandall & Furchtgott-Roth, 1996). Just a year after the Telecommunications 
Act o f 1996, many policymakers were expressing concerns about cable rates not having 
decreased in 1997, thus arguing that economic welfare was not created by deregulation, 
and ignoring the time element and the fact that the telecommunications industry was still 
regulated (Crandall & Furchtgott-Roth, 1996; Hausman & Taylor, 2012).
Deregulation may lead to economic growth via improvements in corporate 
governance, which leads to more innovativeness in companies (Winston, Corsi, Grimm, 
& Evans, 1990). Railroad deregulation led to employment of managers that were 
younger, better educated and had fewer years of company service, suggesting they were 
more creative, which eventually improved economic welfare (Winston et al., 1990). In a 
similar fashion, there is evidence that deregulation in airlines led to employment of
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managers that were more entrepreneurial and more creative, and this eventually led to 
improvement in economic growth (Kole & Lehn, 1997; Meyer & Oster Jr, 1984).
After reviewing deregulation effects in six industries including airline, less-than- 
truckload trucking, truckload trucking, railroads, banking and natural gas, the main 
reasons for economic growth were increase in productivity and reduction o f costs 
(Winston, 1998). Real operating costs in the six industries studied were on average 
reduced from 25 to 75 percent, and this cost reduction led to economic welfare creation 
(Winston, 1998).
The impact of deregulation on banks is examined, and deregulation allowing 
interstate acquisitions and statewide branching is linked to a decrease o f both costs and 
prices of the services provided by banks (Jayaratne & Strahan, 1998), thus leading to a 
more efficient banking system and economic growth.
2.2.2 Deregulation and Capital Flows
This section will review studies that link deregulation with capital flows, because 
enhancement of capital flows often used as a reason for deregulation (Reddy, 2012). The 
majority of studies examining deregulation and capital flows obtain moderately favorable 
results, and this fact distinguishes them from the papers on deregulation and economic 
growth from the previous section and from the papers on labor market and deregulation 
that will be reviewed in the next section. Employing the panel causality method to test if
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deregulation can influence the level o f capital-flight, which indicates the level of 
accumulation of foreign assets by private companies, no significant relationship of 
causality was shown (Yalta & Yalta, 2011). Data was gathered from 21 nations with 
emerging markets for the period of 1980 to 2004, and no evidence of causal relationship 
was established (Yalta & Yalta, 2011). Interesting was the fact that values o f capital- 
flight that were logged in the model appeared to increase its present level, suggesting 
characteristics that can be described as self-reinforcing (Yalta & Yalta, 2011). The 
conclusion that Yalta and Yalta arrived at was that financial deregulations may not 
prevent in any way the appearance of capital-flight (Yalta & Yalta, 2011).
The second study tries to answer if volatility of capital flows changes after 
financial deregulation, and it utilizes the panel data set based on 22 developing and 
industrial nations from 1981 to 2010 (Neumann, Penl, & Tanku, 2009). The data set had 
overlapping values, and researchers examined how financial deregulation is affected by 
the reactions of foreign direct investment, flows of debt and portfolio. The variables that 
measured financial deregulation were borrowed from Kaminsky and Schmukler’s index 
(Kaminsky & Schmukler, 2003). One of the findings was that financial deregulation 
influences various capital flows differently, and while foreign direct investment 
demonstrated a large gain in volatility, portfolio flows were unaffected (Kaminsky & 
Schmukler, 2003). Results that deregulation had mixed effects were particularly strong 
for emerging nations.
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2.2.3 Deregulation and Employment
Improvement of employment is often used as a reason for deregulation (Ebell & 
Haefke, 2009). One should note that the number o f empirical studies analyzing the effects 
of deregulation and employment is relatively low, and most o f  them have data sets based 
on the United States’ deregulations. At the beginning of the 1980s deregulation in the 
state of Delaware was linked to the reduction of unemployment rates in that state by 0.5% 
(Butkiewicz & Latham, 1991). Analysis of the data set o f deregulated banking branching 
across the United States from 1970 to 1988 suggested that employment was higher in the 
states that deregulated and allowed interstate banking (Krol & Svomy, 1996).
In a research study with a model o f a small open economy that had two-period 
inter-temporal set up, deregulation and financial freedom increased aggregate 
employment after all the adjustment processes (Battle, 1997).
It is theoretically established that deregulation is linked to the variation o f banks’ 
ability to generate loans, and the ability to generate loans is linked to variations of 
employment rates (Acemoglu, 2001). According to the model of Acemoglu (2001), in 
the economies with flexible credit markets, arrival of new technologies leads to quick 
channeling of funds to new companies that utilize new technologies, therefore avoiding 
the adverse effect of job loss by companies that suffer the negative effects o f the 
technological shock. Dissimilarly, in economies with highly controlled and inflexible 
credit markets, it is harder for entrepreneurs to have access to funds that are required to
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start up new companies. This leads to continuous decrease in employment (Acemoglu, 
2001).
Similar to Acemoglu, Wasmer and Weil (2004) argue that credit frictions raise the 
equilibrium level o f employment. Wasmer and Weil propose an equilibrium model that 
incorporates imperfections of both the labor and credit markets. Researchers demonstrate 
that low levels o f employment may be the outcome of credit and labor frictions at 
moderate levels. Wasmer and Weil’s model shows that financial deregulation decreases 
transaction costs in the form of search costs for banks; as a result more financiers are 
attracted to credit markets, which then reduce unemployment by attracting a higher 
number o f entrepreneurs. Thus, Wasmer and Weil proposed that the ability to provide 
loans can be diminished when credit frictions from an over-regulated banking sector 
exist, and this condition was linked to a raise of equilibrium unemployment (Wasmer & 
Weil, 2004).
Since 1978, deregulation of American banking has been linked to an increase of 
the growth rate of self-employed income and optimized access for financial resources for 
previously underserved small businesses (Demyanyk, 2008; Demyanyk, Ostergaard, & 
Sorensen, 2007). Deminyak (2008) also points to the existence of a possible transmission 
link via which more pro-competitive regulation for banks acts as an improving 
mechanism for the labor market. The transmission link may include improved quality of 
financial intermediaries (Demyanyk, 2008; Zhang, Wang, & Wang, 2012), larger entry of 
new firms (Denizer, 1997; Laeven, 2003) and quicker capital accumulation (Levchenko, 
Ranciere, & Thoenig, 2009).
Utilizing the data from both pre- and post- deregulation periods, researchers 
examined the changes in the cost structure o f banks, employing a translog cost function 
to see if economies of scale and scope exist (Rezvanian, Rangan, & Grabowski, 2011). 
The results provide evidence that on average the cost curve remained U-shaped, but 
became flatter as time passed, suggesting an increase o f the optimal bank size. 
Economies of scope that took place before the introduction of deregulation became 
exhausted once deregulation was in place (Rezvanian et al., 2011). Another study of 
interstate deregulation of the banking industry in the United States in the 1980s provided 
evidence that regulation dampened volatility for firm-level employment (Correa & 
Suarez, 2007).
The time effect of deregulation was examined in a study assessing outcomes after 
15 years of intrastate branching deregulation in the United States. The evidence 
suggested that deregulation increased the rate o f employment by two percentage points 
(Beck, Levine, & Levkov, 2010). A more recent study again showed that more restrictive 
banking regulations lead to increased unemployment (Feldmann, 2012).
Even though most research papers provide support for the positive effect of 
financial deregulation on employment, there is one paper that finds contrary evidence. 
Deregulation in the U.K. increased unemployment from 1979 to 2005 (Baddeley, 2008). 
An empirical study by Baddeley (2008) is the exception to all the other studies.
The effect o f deregulation on the labor market around the world shows that 
deregulation has a different effect in different nations (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez- 
de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004). In the study of 85 countries where the effect of financial
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deregulation is modeled via employment, collective relations and laws governing the 
social security system, heavier regulation was associated with higher unemployment and 
lower labor participation (Botero et al., 2004). The results are strongest for younger 
people. Countries with socialist, French and Scandinavian legal origins had drastically 
higher levels o f regulation and higher unemployment, as compared to nations with 
common law (Botero et al., 2004).
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2.3 Level I: Institutional Perspective and Industry Variables
One of the largest institutional failures of current times took place when a number 
of United States banks overleveraged their capital structures and took positions in toxic 
assets. This strategy brought those banks to the verge of bankruptcy and put the United 
States’ government in a position where it was forced to bail them out using Troubled 
Asset Relief Program funds, also known as TARP money (Ausubel & Cramton, 2008; 
Bebchuk, 2009). TARP money for “troubled assets” is defined as money for "(A) 
residential or commercial mortgages and any securities, obligations, or other instruments 
that are based on or related to such mortgages, that in each case was originated or issued 
on or before March 14, 2008, the purchase of which the Secretary determines promotes 
financial market stability; and (B) any other financial instrument that the Secretary, after 
consultation with the Chairman of the Board o f Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, determines that the purchase of the instrument is necessary to promote financial 
market stability, but only upon transmittal of such determination, in writing, to the 
appropriate committees of Congress."5 A number of new regulations have been passed 
following this financial crisis, including limits on the leverage levels by financial 
institutions, thus changing the institutional environment and so reducing the overall risk 
within the economy (Lemer, 2011).
Started by Selznik (1957), old institutionalism emphasized that companies will
change and adapt, acting as adaptive systems which change in reaction to the traits of
5 From < http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doclQ056/06-29-TARP.Ddf> [Accessed at 10:12am 
on 03.06.2011]
people within them and inputs from the external environment. Selznick witnessed how 
institutionalization takes place among Tennessee Valley Authority officials who gained 
legitimacy and support by cooptation, and how institutionalization was a mechanism 
transforming external elements into a decision-making system of the company (Selznick, 
1957). Selznick argued that formal structures in organizations serve two purposes: the 
function of defining roles and symbolic properties. Selznick emphasized that social 
legitimacy is accentuated by structures that reflect the values of organizations and also 
provide a connection between core company values and values of a society as a whole 
(Selznick, 1957). According to Selznik, adaptation was mainly for efficiency reasons, and 
this view was supported in the work of Chandler (1962), who did historical analysis of 
four companies, including the energy-production company Standard Oil o f New Jersey, 
the chemical company Du Pont, the automobile producer General Motors, and the retail 
company Sears Roebuck, and documented the wide spread o f multi-divisional or M-form 
(Rumelt & Teece, 1994).
Over time the idea changed and scholars suggested that environment is socially 
constructed (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). If society rewards companies that are efficient, 
operate in rational ways, and demonstrate ability to take risks, it will value companies 
whose structures reflect those values best, regardless o f whether actual behavior in the 
companies is consistent (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This put forward the idea that social 
perceptions are important for companies’ successes. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that 
external social perceptions were at times more powerful than internal processes of 
production. The value of social legitimacy of observed organizational structures, even 
when structures were dysfunctional, often surpassed observed outcomes o f performance
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(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). As a consequence of this finding, various resources would flow 
to companies that demonstrate the highest levels of isomorphic consistency with the 
environment that they are operating in. Interestingly, the flow of resources would occur 
despite possible inefficiencies of those companies (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This is 
especially important for not-for-profit companies and public sector organizations, many 
of which, in order to be successful, develop the ability to act in accordance with the 
“legitimacy rule.” And it all takes place because companies are legitimated externally on 
bases other than production efficiencies (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Isomorphism is defined 
along two dimensions: (1) boundary-spanning connections between companies and the 
environment are the outcome of technology exchanges and forced diffusion of 
institutional practices, myths and norms (Thompson, 1967), and (2) socially constructed 
realities are mirrored by organizational structures (Berger & Luckmann, 1967).
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggested that companies converge over time in the 
legitimacy dimension, becoming more similar rather than more heterogeneous. 
Organizational change takes place due to the vectors forcing companies to assimilate, but 
not necessarily become more efficient, they argued (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggested that in the environments with high levels of 
uncertainty, managers observe the behavior of other managers, particularly those from 
highly legitimate companies, in order to implement organizational change.
DiMaggio and Powell argued that convergence happens through isomorphism that 
can have three forms: (1) coercive isomorphism -  a result of formal and informal 
pressures exerted on the company by other organizations on which it is dependent, (2) 
mimetic isomorphism -  a result of companies voluntarily modeling themselves after
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organizations that are perceived to have higher status, i.e. more legitimacy, and (3) 
normative isomorphism -  a result of professionalization and formal education, which via 
socialization leads to conformity on informal rules, customs and various patterns of 
communication and interaction (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999).
The theoretical foundations of institutional isomorphism are based on the notion 
that companies compete for more than clientele or resources; they compete for political 
influence and institutional legitimacy (Garcia-Pont & Nohria, 2002; Park & Luo, 2001). 
The organizational field is a set of companies that constitute an area o f institutional life 
that can be recognized, making it similar to the notion of organizational population 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Hannan & Freeman, 1978). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
suggested that as time goes by, various inventions are diffused in the society, and slowly 
continuing adoption is done not for productivity enhancements but for legitimacy 
reasons. Over time the aggregate result of organizational change is to lessen the diversity 
of organizations. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that the rationale for 
organizational change includes the following: traits of companies are changed to enhance 
compatibility with the traits o f the environment, the number o f companies in the 
population is a function of the carrying capacity o f the population, and the variety of 
organizational types is isomorphic to the variety o f environmental surroundings. When 
two companies depend on each other, that dependence promotes isomorphism, in order to 
enhance the exchange relationship between the two (Nelson & Gopalan, 2003). 
Environmental uncertainty forces isomorphism when less successful companies try to 
copy more successful organizational forms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Sets of 
companies where a high degree of reliance on professionalism prevails will have higher
29
levels of isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Environments with highly 
concentrated resources stimulate isomorphism. Power is measured by the company’s 
ability to ‘determine’ or ‘change’ social myths and results from a high degree of 
legitimacy of a particular company.
Summarizing the main research work pieces on institutional theory, one can say 
that organizations are legitimated externally by society rather than in terms of their 
performance (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Over time organizational changes occur because 
of processes that make organizations more similar, but not necessarily more efficient 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Also, institutions consist o f cognitive, normative, and 
regulative “pillars” that provide meaning to social behavior (Scott, 2001).
2.3.1 Players in the Institutional Environment: Credit Rating Agencies
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are important players and contributors to the 
institutional dimension of the environment of financial systems, and were extensively 
criticized before and especially after the current crisis. Due to their business objectives, 
credit rating agencies have conflicting goals, such as preserving large customers and 
signaling to the market the credit worthiness of banks (Carl, 2009; Matthew & Lawrence, 
2009; Powell, Rigobon, & Cavallo, 2009). Conflict of interests can result in credit rating 
agencies being in a position where they are reluctant to rate larger banks as riskier 
investments due to the banks’ economic influence, and they are only too eager to rate
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them favorably (Griffin & Tang, 2011; Lipszyc, 2011). In addition, banks can choose 
CRAs, and so they can shop around for the most favorable credit rating (Cantor & 
Packer, 1995; Lipszyc, 2011). CRAs suggested that their ratings are stable because they 
measure the default risk over the long investment horizon and only incorporate 
information that is likely to be enduring (Cantor, 2001; Cantor & Mann, 2003). 
Ironically, because of the scale of potential impact on the economy, ratings o f larger 
banks should be examples of accuracy and precision (Griffin & Tang, 2011). It may be 
because of conflicts o f interest o f CRAs that the United States and world economy is 
going through one of the worst financial calamities since the Great Depression.
There are 64 credit rating agencies worldwide6; in the United States the largest 
ones are: Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch. The SEC currently designates 6 
agencies as “nationally recognized statistical rating organizations” (NRSROs). They have 
letter designations for credit ratings such as AAA, BB, or CC. Credit rating agencies have 
been criticized for large losses in the Collaterized Debt Obligations (CDO) (Fong, Hong, 
Kacperczyk, & Kubik, 2011). Examples of such losses can be $340.7 million worth of 
CDOs issued by Credit Suisse Group that added up to about $125 million. This security 
was rated AAA by Fitch. Another major criticism is that CRAs do not downgrade firms 
promptly enough; for instance, Enron's rating remained at investment grade four days 
before the company went bankrupt (De Lange & Arnold, 2012; Lundblad & Davidson, 
2011). Current reliance on CRAs increased due to: (1) financial market complexity and 
(2) borrowers’ diversity (Cantor & Packer, 1995).
6 From < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credit rating aeencv> [Accessed 02.22.2011 at 23:58]
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CRAs addressed criticisms of being slow in adjusting their ratings, stating that 
they use the through-the-cycle methodology (Griffin & Tang, 2011). According to 
Moody’s, through-the-cycle ratings are stable because they are intended to measure 
default risk over long investment horizons, and because they are changed only when 
agencies are confident that observed changes in a company’s risk profile are likely to be 
permanent. Credit rating agencies were compared to banks because both consider similar 
risk factors (Griffin & Tang, 2011; Treacy & Carey, 2000), and both rely heavily on 
judgment and cultural elements (Carl, 2009), rather than on detailed and mechanical 
guidance and procedures (Treacy & Carey, 2000). However, CRAs publish 
supplementary rating descriptions of rating criteria that are much more detailed than 
banks’ internal guidelines.
Some good news is that some researchers observed secular tightening o f rating 
agency standards (Blume, Lim, & Mackinlay, 1998). Yet this paper contradicts findings 
that leverage ratios deteriorated and default rates rose within rating categories (Cantor & 
Packer, 1995). Unrealistic panel regression estimates o f rating determinants implicitly 
assume that ratings adjust instantaneously to new information (Altman & Rijken, 2004). 
Rating migration policies of the agencies do not follow “point-in-time” rating practices 
(Altman & Rijken, 2004). Agency ratings are stable because they are intended to measure 
the default risk over the long investment horizon and only when observed changes in a 
company’s risk profile are likely enduring (Cantor, 2001; Fons, 2002; Cantor & Mann,
2003).
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2.3.2 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
After the passing of The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, also known as the Financial 
Services Modernization Act o f 1999, or the Citigroup Relief Act that overturned 
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, deregulation of investment banking took place (Mamun, 
Hassan, & Van Lai, 2004). This regulatory change destroyed safety mechanisms, or as 
George Soros referred to it: “the principles of oil tanker design ... if  they're 
compartmentalized, the risk o f crisis is much lower”; thus, deregulation eliminated 
compartmentalization of the financial system that was ensuring against large scale 
financial calamities (George Soros, 2011). Among other things, this deregulation allowed 
banks to borrow extensively and have leverage ratios as high as 1 to 30, and created an 
environment with less regulatory framework (Mamun, Hassan, & Maroney, 2005; Neale 
& Peterson, 2005).
Environments with fewer regulations would lead to organizational forms that 
operate with more freedom and thus are accustomed to a higher degree o f autonomy and 
risk-taking (Van Den Bosch, Volberda, & De Boer, 1999). Not only a small number of 
regulations, or absence of particular laws, would promote risk-taking tendencies among 
sets of companies, but also environments where few regulatory agencies exist would have 
a similar effect (Gilardi, 2002). Regulatory agencies act as watchdogs, and when their 
relative number is low, the ability o f regulatory agencies to effectively conduct 
surveillance and enforce regulations decreases, effectively creating an environment with 
fewer regulations (Gilardi, 2002). A high number of risk-taking companies in the 
environment with few regulations would lead to the institutionalization of risk-taking
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behavior across the board. Less successful firms would want to imitate more successful 
“highly-risk-loving” companies, and eventually larger degrees of risk-taking would be 
manifested as a norm (DiMaggio, 2011; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). One of the ways in 
which environmental change can be measured is the introduction o f a new law that can 
substantially limit freedom in risk taking strategies that companies have. Other examples 
o f this can be regulations that relate to reserve levels of banks, in essence affecting the 
level of debt that banks can have in their capital structure (Keister, 2010). The level of 
debt of financial institutions is called leverage, and is one of the indications of risk 
(Adrian & Shin, 2010), so change in such regulation changes risk levels across the board. 
To measure the change of the regulatory environment we need to look for the event that 
reshaped it, and a good example is the introduction of a new law such as the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act7 of 2002 (Sarbanes, 2002; Zhang, 2007) or introduction o f deregulation such 
as The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Mamun et al., 2005; Neale & Peterson, 2005). 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was a good example of the deregulation that led to more 
freedom in decision-making, and it leads us to the first Hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Deregulation o f an industry will be associated with higher
corporate risk-taking in that industry.
7 Known in the Senate as the 'Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act1 
and in the House as 'Corporate and Auditing Accountability and Responsibility Act.' This act is 
a federal law o f the United States that set revised standards for all American publicly traded 
companies, their boards o f directors, executive teams and public accounting corporations.
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Change in regulation will have two effects. One is a direct effect of regulatory 
change, and the other is the effect of changes in norms, customs and beliefs. And while 
the first effect would be immediate, change in norms would take longer and would 
become more pronounced with the passage of time (Scott, 1995,2001, 2003).
Institutional theory emphasizes mimetic isomorphism as a response mechanism to 
reduce uncertainty, which according to DiMaggio and Powel (1983, p. 151) is a low-cost 
variety of problemistic search. Later empirical research has established this correlation by 
demonstrating that mimetic behavior is stronger when uncertainty is higher (Haunschild, 
1994). Extensions to institutional theory are being made by scholars studying the 
interaction effects between mimetic processes and problemistic search (Chuang & Baum, 
2003; Rao, Greve, & Davis, 2001). The new institutional theory argues that legitimacy 
provides competitive edge (Scott, 1995, 2001, 2003) and rests on three pillars that do not 
need to be present simultaneously: (1) cognitive -  alignment with cognitive maps 
manifested in values, language, customs, religious view, etc.; (2) normative -  alignment 
with particular professional norms, such as the integrity component o f the accounting 
profession (Grey, 2002, 2004); (3) regulative -  alignment with requirements that define 
the legal landscape of business environments, such as antitrust laws. Deregulation in legal 
framework would lead to changes in norms, beliefs and performance expectations over 
time, thus:
Hypothesis 2. After deregulation, over time, corporate risk-taking will increase.
Deregulation may also increase competition as there are more companies with 
similar profiles, i.e. of the same size, similar financial profile, similar talent pool, and 
with market commonalities and resource similarities (Chang & Xu, 2008). This happens 
because there would always be struggle for change in status quo, thus promoting highly 
competitive and more un-collaborative behavior (Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1996). 
Institutional theory outlines how a company adapts to a symbolic environment of 
cognitive maps and regulatory framework of rules, and while doing so, it emphasizes (1) 
bounded rationality, (2) uncertainty avoidance, (3) loose coupling and (4) decision­
making under uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). All of 
these are borrowings of institutional theory from behavioral theory o f the firm (Argote & 
Greve, 2007), which will be discussed in the next chapter
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2.4 Level II: Behavioral Theory of the Firm
This section starts with the review of bounded rationality in human behavior 
(Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002). Concepts from the bounded rationality of humans allow us 
to better understand their aspirations and are considered by some researchers as the 
foundation to the behavioral theory of the firm (Bromiley & Papenhausen, 2003). After 
bounded rationality, prospect theory was reviewed (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1992), because along with behavioral theory o f the firm, prospect theory is 
considered a major theory on risk in strategic management (Holmes Jr, Bromiley, 
Devers, Holcomb, & McGuire, 2011). Then, behavioral theory of the firm is laid out and 
hypotheses relevant to corporate aspirations are developed. While classical behavioral 
theory of the firm links aspirations with performance, in this dissertation, aspirations are 
linked with corporate risk-taking, and this is a major novel contribution.
2.4.1 Bounded Rationality
Bounded rationality of individuals leads to a series o f limitations when making 
decisions, and this effect was noticed by psychologists and practitioners o f decision­
making (Simon, 1947). Simon examines the internal decision-making processes of 
corporations and outlines how values of companies affect decision-making of people 
working for them, by establishing consistency of decisions and ensuring that decisions
are compatible with overarching company goals. March and Simon (1958) argue that 
analysis of people’s behavior within companies should include various aspects o f human 
behavior and must consider motivational, rational and attitudinal dimensions. This means 
that the science of organizations is based on two streams - first, the research of 
economists on the planning process and, second, the research of psychologists on 
organizational communication and abilities to solve-problems (Pfeffer, 1993).
“Bounded rationality assumes that individuals easily satisfied; that is they select 
the first alternative that is good enough because the costs o f optimizing in terms of time 
and effort are too great” (Ackoff, 1981; p. 22). This means there is a limit on the level of 
rationality that a human may demonstrate. “A theory of bounded rationality also assumed 
that individuals develop shortcuts, rules of thumb, or heuristics, to make decisions in 
order to save mental activity” (Nelson & Quick, 2006; p. 314). These notions have 
following implications for organizational behavior: “Given the limitations and systematic 
biases of the individual, those operating from a behavioral perspective tend to view the 
organization as a more efficient information processor than any individual. The firm is 
considered to be an institutional response to uncertainty and bounded rationality at the 
individual level” (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1992; p. 107). This means that under challenging 
circumstances companies will try to make satisfactory instead of optimal decisions.
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2.4.2 Prospect Theory
Prospect theory describes how individuals make decisions under risk (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). This theory explains how people evaluate potential gains and losses. 
There are many anomalies and effects based on prospect theory. It is particularly 
interesting to look at the pseudocertainty effect, which is the study o f individuals being 
risk-averse or risk-loving depending on if  the gamble relates to gaining or losing, and on 
the amounts involved (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1986). Pseudocertainty effect 
suggests that people are more sensitive to losing a given amount than to gaining the same 
amount.
Behavior of executives of investment banks when they manipulate earnings can 
be looked at from the prospect theory point o f view (Bartov & Mohanram, 2004). There 
is evidence that people consider it ethically more acceptable when earnings are 
manipulated down, rather than up, and for small amounts rather than large ones (Dechow, 
Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996). For executives in power, prospect theory suggests that 
managers would be more inclined to manipulate if  there is a chance that earnings will 
decrease, because this usually leads to immediate negative consequences for them 
(Beneish, 1999). Several papers prove this idea. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) found 
evidence that companies manage earnings so as to avoid sudden decreases or losses, and 
pointed to prospect theory as an explanation of such behavior.
Matsumoto (2002) argues that managers try to avoid negative earnings by 
employing positive abnormal accruals and forecasts that are lower than expected. He also
finds that firms that have higher institutional ownership, greater reliance on implicit 
claims with stakeholders, and higher value-relevance of earnings were more inclined to 
exceed earnings expectations. Kasznik (1996) investigates the connection between 
voluntary disclosure of companies and management’s good judgment over accounting 
decisions (Kasznik, 1996). Earnings management was used as a tool to correct 
management’s earnings projection errors (Bergstresser, Desai, & Rauh, 2006). Empirical 
results suggest that managers, who are intimidated by the possibility of costly litigations 
by shareholders or credibility failure leading to the loss o f reputation, use accounting 
techniques to reduce their forecast inaccuracies (Rosner, 2003).
Managers also make operating decisions to avoid reporting losses (Bergstresser et 
al., 2006). Those decisions include price discounts to temporarily increase sales to meet 
annual numbers, or overproduction, which in reports decreases the cost of goods sold 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). However, manipulation o f real activities is less likely to take 
place in the presence of sophisticated investors, who can spot activities which do not 
contribute to long run profitability.
An interesting empirical work tested if publicly held financial companies would 
report fewer earnings decreases over a 12 year period (Beatty, Ke, & Petroni, 1999). 
Researchers discovered that publicly held banks with earnings near zero were 
substantially less likely to report low earnings in comparison to private banks. In that 
research, control variables were bank size, differences in given loans and cash flow 
streams. A peculiar finding was that after controlling for the length of cash flows, the 
length of the stream of consecutive earnings increases was greater for public financial
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institutions (Beatty et al., 1999). Researchers concluded that public banks’ managers face 
higher pressure and incentive to report higher earnings than private banks’ managers.
Research papers in this section are evidence supporting prospect theory and 
explaining the reason why managers o f investment banks that are not doing well 
manipulate earnings more eagerly, more often and on a larger scale (Swartz & Watkins, 
2003; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2004; Zandstra, 2002).
2.4.3 Risk Taking and Organizational Aspirations
Cyert and March’s (1963) BTOF8 inspired a number of studies by Bromiley 
(Bromiley, 1991; Bromiley, 1999; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1991) and his students (Miller, 
1998; Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Miller & Leiblein, 1996b; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996; 
Wiseman & Catanach, 1997). The core o f BTOF is the search for strategies reducing 
uncertainty, and it provides a platform to build a theory about organizational risk. The 
explicit link between risk and behavioral theory of the firm was made by March and 
Shapira (1987; 1992), as well as some modifications to the initial theory. Behavioral 
theory of the firm suggests two approaches to risk taking; the first is based on the work of 
Cyert and March (1963), and the second is based on March and Shapira (1987; 1992).
March and Shapira (1987; 1992) interviewed a number o f managers and 
concluded that executives navigate using two reference points: (1) a possibility of
8 Behavioral Theory o f the Firm
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bankruptcy and (2) aspiration level. If executives fear that their company is set to go 
bankrupt, they will make highly risky decisions in order to avoid the disaster. Companies 
with higher performance and a miniscule chance of going bankrupt will have a different 
reference point and will make decisions that will reduce risk and probability of 
bankruptcy. March and Shapira (1987) argued that most executives use industry average 
or performance in the past as a benchmark for their reference point. So, for the majority 
o f companies operating near aspiration levels, risk taking will be low, but it would 
increase proportionally as performance distances from aspirations. Companies operating 
below aspirations take chances as an attempt to reach aspirations.
From the behavioral perspective, a company is represented as a coalition of 
various constituencies (Cyert & March, 1963), and all organized business activities are 
actually emerged into unpredictability and ambiguity. Managers face the challenge of 
constantly balancing competing and conflicting goals (Vibert, 2004). Most scholars 
doing research in behavioral theory of the firm believe that executives can be effective in 
their balancing attempts. Fulfilling the goals of “stakeholders (shareholders, customers, 
employees, unions, managers) is possible if  managers make decisions to integrate and 
mediate the interests o f shareholders, employees and customers” (Eisenhardt & Brown, 
1992; p. 107). Still, now and then the complexity of balancing can be overwhelming, 
considering that the interests of members of the ruling coalition are dynamic and 
constantly changing, while the makeup of the coalition members changes, too (Vibert,
2004).
The actual process of decision-making was emphasized by behavioral theorists 
Cyert and March (1963), who provide extensive observations of the routines o f decision­
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making in organizations. A process-oriented and empirically enhanced theory of 
decisions in economic terms by various companies suggested by Cyert and March (1963) 
stood the test o f time, and they are credited with presenting the basics o f the behavioral 
theory of the firm, which up until today stays relevant in strategic management and 
economics. Business decisions are characterized by unique dimensions, including: quasi 
resolution of conflict, problematic search, avoidance of risks and learning within 
organizations (Cyert & March, 1963).
In behavioral theory of the firm the relationship of companies’ aspirations and 
performance levels is examined. When performance surpasses aspirations the company 
continues to operate in accordance with established norms and routines (Bromiley et al.,
2001). However, when performance falls below aspirations, executives search for ways to 
improve performance. This difference between aspirations and performance is sometimes 
referred to as attainment discrepancy (Lant, 1992). The organizational search for new 
ways increases corporate risk (Bromiley, 1991; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1991). Behavioral 
theory of the firm argues that extremely high levels of corporate performance lead to 
innovation via availability of slack. Innovative risk taking does not increase the risk of 
performing below aspirations (Bromiley, 1991; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1991).
Cyert and March (1963) argue that organizational aspirations are desired 
performance levels in specific organizational outcomes and that organizations adjust their 
aspirations based on past experience. Since past performance is judged as aspirations, 
firms are expected to select new strategies to increase performance (Cyert & March, 
1963). The aspirations level depends on comparisons to the firm’s own past performance 
(Cyert and March, 1963), thus:
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Hypothesis 3. Investment banks with aspirations above performance will be 
associated with higher corporate risk-taking, as compared to investment banks 
with aspirations equal to or below performance.
Behavioral theory of the firm led to the rise in research in both evolutionary 
economics and in organizational learning (Argote & Greve, 2007). “A key assumption of 
the behavioral theory of the firm is that firms adjust their behavior in response to their 
experience rather than acting on their expectations o f future states o f the world” (Lant & 
Shapira, 2008; p. 60). The aspirations level depends on comparisons to other relevant 
companies, or peer group, which constitutes the industry (Bromiley, 1991; Lant 1992). 
Companies with performance below industry averages will aspire to outperform those 
averages, while companies with performance above industry averages will tend to 
improve very little, if at all (Lant, 1992). High aspirations, caused by performance o f the 
peer group, lead to new strategies that are generally assumed to involve increased risk 
levels of companies (Bromiley, 1991), thus
Hypothesis 4. Investment banks with higher aspirations will be associated with 
higher corporate risk-taking, as compared to investment banks with lower 
aspirations.
Aspiration level depends on two kinds o f comparison: comparison to the firm’s 
own past and comparison to the relevant others (Cyert & March, 1963). Because this 
model depends on both comparison to the company’s past and comparison to relevant 
others, the risk function is assumed to be non-linear. In general, risk taking increases as 
companies fall more and more below the industry norms. For companies that outperform 
the norms, risk taking is purely a function of relative past performance (Lant, 1992).
Behavioral theory of the firm is relevant to investment banking because one o f the 
effects of deregulation was newly set high aspirations that were coming from past 
performance and observations of performance of peer group banks; thus, aspirations in 
investment banks were forcing executives to increase corporate risk-taking. Behavioral 
theory of the firm led to organizational learning theory (Argote & Greve, 2007; Huber, 
1991; Miner & Mezias, 1996), as well as evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter,
2002). The organizational learning and knowledge part of it will be analyzed in the next 
chapter of this dissertation.
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2.5 Level HI: Resources and Knowledge
So far we have seen that the more general macro perspective o f industry view 
partially explains the predisposition to corporate risk-taking. A more focused view of 
companies’ aspirations also partially explains corporate risk-taking. What about corporate 
resources? Research suggests that companies with more resources of a particular type, for 
instance, financial resources like liquid assets, can employ more sophisticated risk 
management systems and are perceived as less risky (Venter, 2009). Not only do 
financial resources allow companies to employ more sophisticated risk management 
systems, but also the simple presence o f liquid assets like cash sends a signal that the 
company will not have short-term solvency issues (Rochet, 1999). This section will start 
with the history of resource based view, then the evolution of resource based view into 
knowledge based view will be discussed, and a set o f hypotheses will be introduced.
A number of researchers follow Ricardian perspective (Ricardo, 1817), which was 
later developed into a “resource-based view,” which argues that picking the right 
resources is the main way to generate economic wealth (Barney, 1986a, b, 1991; Mata, 
Fuerst, & Barney, 1995; Penrose, 1959). According to the Ricardian work, variations in 
performance are attributed to ownership of resources that have a degree of difference in 
productivity, or as Ricardo puts it: “original, unaugmentable, and indestructible gifts of 
Nature” (Ricardo, 1817). Most o f these early studies focused on economic aspects of 
owning land (Barney & Arikan, 2001). Because the supply of land is fixed and does not 
fluctuate depending on changes in price, demand for land as a factor o f production is
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totally inelastic (Hirshleifer, 1958). This inelastic supply allows owners o f land to enjoy 
an economic rent, i.e. a payment to the owner of the factor o f  production in excess of the 
cost of the factor (Hirshleifer, 1958; Hirshleifer, Glazer, & Hirshleifer, 2005).
The foundations o f the resource-based view are attributed to the industrial 
organizational economist Edith Penrose (1959), who in her book The Theory o f  the 
Growth o f  the Firm argues that a firm is a “bundle of resources.” Penrose, acknowledging 
that companies operate in the environments where attracting human and financial capital 
is a constant struggle, takes the analytical framework inside the firm to understand what 
principles govern corporate growth. Penrose (1959) suggests that the principles of the 
firms’ growth are rooted in the excess resources and argues that corporate expansion is a 
natural process when companies have excess resources, while absence o f resources may 
be the largest limiting factor to growth. Penrose (1959) suggests that along with being 
viewed as bundles of resources, companies should also be viewed as administrative 
systems linking and coordinating the efforts of many individuals. According to Penrose 
(1959), the main task of managers is to use the bundle of resources under the company’s 
control via the employment of the administrative framework that exists in the company. 
Limitations for the company’s growth lie in (1) the productive opportunities that are 
present as a function of the bundle of productive resources under the company’s control, 
and (2) the administrative system in place to coordinate the employment o f these 
resources (Penrose, 1959).
Penrose (1959) makes two main contributions to organizational science; first -  
she proposes that firms can combine resources in different ways, and second -  she 
outlines that resources have a lumpiness element to them, and that lumpiness leads to
excesses that drive companies’ growth. While developing RBV, Penrose (1959) proposes 
that: (1) bundles of resources can vary significantly among firms — making firms even 
within one industry heterogeneous, (2) productive resource should have a broad 
definition -  thus moving from a Ricardian focus on land, and adding managerial teams, 
groups of top executives and entrepreneurial abilities, and (3) admitting that even within 
extended typologies there are more sources of corporate heterogeneity. Penrose (1959) 
views entrepreneurial abilities as one of the productive resources, arguing that some 
managers are more resourceful, able to fund-raise better, have more ambition, and 
possess stronger cognitive skills to exercise better judgment than other managers. Penrose 
(1959) explains possible motivations for diversification as an excess capacity and 
provides rationale for the direction of diversification. While she describes in some detail 
how resources lead or constrain the growth process of companies, she never addressed 
how fast growth can happen, or what companies can do to expedite growth.
The question of how firms come to own resources with heterogeneous 
productivity levels remained open for quite some time. It was addressed in ‘strategic 
factor market’ theory (Barney, 1986b). The gist of that theory is that there is only one 
non-random and methodical way for a company to come to own the set o f resources 
capable of creating higher than average levels o f return: the company should possess 
resource-picking skill superior to its competitors (Barney, 1986b). This can be done by 
developing methodically more precise expectations about the future value of resources 
than other players in the resource market (Barney, 1986b). One important inference of 
Ricardian based theory is that the decisions related to creating economic rent take place 
before the acquisition of resources. So, companies either have superior resource-picking
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skill or possess unique information about the resources. Resource-based view emphasizes 
company-specific capabilities and assets and the existence of dividing devices as the 
basic determinants of company performance (Barney, Wright, & Ketchen, 2001; Birger, 
1984; Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1984). Resource-based view recognizes the nature of the 
isolating devices that allow entrepreneurial returns and competitive advantage to be 
unrelenting (Birger, 1984).
Daft (1983) puts forward the idea that resources include not only capital, labor 
and machinery, but also various organizational processes, capabilities, firm attributes, 
information, knowledge, procedures and methods of doing things within the company 
that enable the organization to develop strategies geared toward improvement of 
efficiency and effectiveness. Wemerfelt (1984) argues that a company’s competitive 
advantage is based on and is a direct function of the application of the bundle of 
resources that are valuable and under that firm’s direct control.
Barney (1991) puts forward the idea that in order to have sustainable competitive 
advantage, companies need to possess special resources, and those resources must be: 
(1) heterogeneous in nature -  if  resources are homogeneous, they will not provide 
substantial advantage to the company; and (2) not-perfectly mobile -  if  resources are 
easily mobile, then it will be possible for other companies to move needed resources from 
other locations. In that same paper Barney (1991) developed VRIN framework, 
suggesting that not all resources would lead to competitive advantage but only those that 
are: (1) valuable -  in order to provide competitive advantage resources should possess 
value; (2) rare -  those resources should be rare, meaning that the number o f those who 
want to possess them must be higher than the available resources; (3) inimitable -  it
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should be hard to imitate those resources for competitors by means o f backward 
engineering, etc.; (4) non-substitutable -  there should not be strategic substitutes o f those 
resources. Barney (1991) argues that strategic substitutes can have two forms: (1) similar 
resources -  one type of plastic similar to another; and (2) strategic substitutes -  
composite material can be a strategic substitute to metal, or sun energy can be a strategic 
substitute to oil energy, if  the price of those energy types will be comparable.
Priem and Butler (2001) criticize Barney’s framework, suggesting that resource- 
based view is a theory of sustainability and not a theory of competitive advantage. They 
argue that resource-based view is: (1) tautological and self-satisfying; (2) has circular 
logic which makes it operationally invalid; (3) different combinations o f resources can 
produce the same outcome and thus be competitive advantage; (4) not a theory of 
competitive advantage, but a theory of sustainability; (5) the effect o f product markets are 
not developed enough; and (6) it lacks a dynamic element, giving it few prescriptive 
implications. Barney (2001) responds to Priem and Butler’s (2001) criticisms, stating 
that: (1) using the logic of Priem and Butler it can be shown that any strategic 
management theory is tautological and has circular logic; and (2) equifmality -  Barney 
argued that if different combinations of resources produce the same output, they by 
definition are not valuable and become homogeneous (since there is an infinite number of 
combinations to achieve that), and that his theory deals with heterogeneous resources, 
and (3) Barney agrees that not enough work has been done in the dynamic aspect and 
suggests that more studies should be undertaken.
Nair, Trendowski, and Judge (2008) criticized resource-based view for the lack 
of testability, suggesting that to develop theoretical principles and establish logical
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connections, mostly histories were used. Researchers emphasized that testing resource- 
based view remains problematic because constructs such as entrepreneurship and 
management are defined too broadly (Nair et al., 2008).
Barney and Aakan (2001) conduct a meta analysis and review all empirical testing 
of resource-based view. They studied 166 research papers and concluded that only four 
were not supporting resource-based view, and the remaining 162 (or almost 98%) were 
supporting resource-based view. Newbert (2007) decides to check the above assertion of 
Barney and Aakan. He conducts a more refined search of articles based on keywords 
such as: Barney, resource-based view, VRIN, etc. He also adds 12 additional key words 
and searches for articles in major management journals using AIB/Inform. In addition, 
Newberg hires proofreaders to thoroughly check if the selected articles are within the 
resource-based view frame. He ends up with a sample of 55 articles and 87 statistical 
tests/sets. His findings were more humble, suggesting that only 53% of articles actually 
supported resource-based view, and that the extent of that support varies.
2.5.1 Knowledge as a Resource and a Capability
Resource-based view led to development of dynamic capabilities framework 
(Teece 1997, Makadok 2001). While dynamic capabilities explain competitive advantage 
in high-velocity environments, researchers are still arguing on what to include into this 
construct; some suggest the product development routines of Toyota or the design
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routines o f IDEO, and how to measure them (Please see Appendix B). Due to the very 
nature of dynamic capabilities in highly competitive and fast changing environments they 
have the ability to improvise, which makes studying them yet harder (Vibert, 2004).
There were also interesting works linking resource-based view to capabilities in 
general, with capabilities lifecycle or CLC framework. This framework suggests that 
there can be dynamic resources which are different from dynamic capabilities.
There were some research works which challenged Ricardian perspective by 
Schumpeterian perspective (Schumpeter, 1950), which some authors believe was later 
developed into “dynamic capabilities view” (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). Schumpeterian dynamic capability framework 
draws attention to the significance of the alternative return generating system -  
capability-building -  which has several distinctions from resource-picking. To make the 
discussion of ‘resource’ and ‘capability’ clear, let us review some definitions. Amit and 
Schoemaker (1993) referred to dynamic capabilities as: “A firm’s capacity to deploy 
resources, usually in combination, using organizational processes, to effect a desired end. 
They are information-based, tangible or intangible processes that are firm-specific and 
are developed over time through complex interactions among the firm’s resources. They 
can abstractly be thought of as ‘intermediate goods’ generated by the firm to provide 
enhanced productivity of its resources, as well as strategic flexibility and protection for 
its final product or service.”
There are two main attributes distinguishing all other types o f resources from a 
capability. First, the capability is company-specific, and it is rooted in organizational
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processes, while other resources may not be. And because o f this rootedness, capability 
may not be easily transferable from one firm to the other without also transferring 
ownership of the firm, or at least a self-contained subsidiary of the organization. In this 
regard, Teece et al. (1997a) stated: “that which is distinctive cannot be bought and sold 
short of buying the firm itself, or one or more of its subunits.” This suggests that if  the 
company was to entirely disappear its resources can be preserved in the hands of new 
owners while its capabilities would also dissolve. For instance, if  AMD Corporation 
disappeared, then its microprocessor patents would continue to exist and would just 
change owners, but its skill in designing new architecture o f processors would vanish. 
AMD Corporation could easily transfer the rights of its microprocessor patents to a 
different corporation, but it cannot easily transfer the capability or the skill of devising 
new processors, unless it was willing to lose a core part of itself. The second distinctive 
attribute of a capability is to improve the efficiency of other resources that the company 
possesses -  or so-called ‘intermediate goods’ equivalence (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). 
This distinction between a resource and capability is similar to distinctions between 
‘systemic’ and ‘discrete’ resources (Miller & Shamsie, 1996), or ‘elementary’ and 
‘higher-level’ resources (Brumagin, 1994), or ‘traits’ and ‘configurations’ (Black & Boal, 
1994).
An important distinction between resource-picking and capability-building is 
timing. The resource-picking mechanism creates economic profits before the acquisition 
of resources. On the contrary, capability-building generates economic rent after the 
resources are possessed. And no matter how great a company’s capabilities are, if  the 
company fails to obtain needed resources it will not be able to utilize its capabilities.
Resource-based view evolved into knowledge-based view, which argues that 
knowledge, both implicit and explicit, contributes to a company’s performance (Grant, 
1996a). Knowledge-based view, according to some researchers, is the special case of 
resource-based view, and that is one of the criticisms of knowledge-based view (Felin & 
Hesterly, 2007; Vibert, 2004). Via knowledge-based view, resource-based view can be 
linked to transaction cost economics in the sense that knowledge, which is a particular 
type of resource, can substantially decrease transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, 1985; 
Williamson, 1981), and full knowledge on the side o f principal can reduce agency 
problem, thus linking to agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).
Resource-based view explains diversification strategy well when attention is 
moved from product-market participants, including customers, suppliers and rivals, to the 
resource base of the company, such as financial capital, labor, technology, etc. Resource- 
based view outlines limitations for the corporate growth, arguing that available resources 
and managerial talent might be limiting possibilities of market entries or administering 
effective growth (Amit & Wemerfelt, 1990). Resource-based view clarifies motivation 
for diversification, arguing that it is excessive capacity and unused productive facilities 
(Penrose, 1959). If excessive capacity drives diversification, then by measuring how 
diversified a company is we can establish if that company has slack in its system.
The slack of resources in the system, while providing an opportunity to grow via 
diversification, would also lead to a sense of safety among managers, thus making them 
act in more risk loving ways in certain divisions, particularly ones exhibiting aggressive 
risk culture, such as investment banking (Ang, 1991). Resource-based view predicts that
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the vector of diversification depends on the quantity and nature of resources available to 
the firm. Different quantities and bundles of resources may push companies toward either 
related or unrelated diversification (Chatterjee & Wemerfelt, 1991; Montgomery & 
Hariharan, 1991). Thus, companies with larger resource bases are more likely to go for 
unrelated diversification than companies that have lower resource bases.
Resource-based view, along with transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1979, 1998) and industrial organizational economics 
(Bain, 1956; Caves, 1964; Mason, 1939; Porter, 1980) contributed to the development of 
diversification theory. Resource-based view is used as one of the tools to analyze 
formations of joint ventures and alliances directly or through the knowledge-based view. 
Resource-based view is applied and used in conjunction with the network theory (Uzzi, 
1996, 1997) in the sense that position within networks with higher centrality score, or 




Rooted in the resource-based view, knowledge-based view develops the idea of 
Penrose that a firm is a bundle of resources (Penrose, 1959) and emphasizes knowledge 
as a key aspect o f growth and prosperity. Specifically, knowledge-based view proposes 
the idea that the firm’s skills at combining knowledge facilitate sustainable growth and 
development (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Kogut & Zander, 1993). Knowledge-based view is 
built on the idea that knowledge is a firm’s most important resource (Grant, 1996b). The 
firm's existence and boundaries can be explained via its unique ability to obtain, build, 
combine, and retain knowledge (Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1993, 
1996).
Why is knowledge based view applicable to investment banking? Investment 
banks diversified due to deregulation, but many lacked knowledge o f the markets that 
they entered, in particular, knowledge of the architecture o f CDOs and real estate market 
securities (Griffin & Tang, 2011; Longstaff & Rajan, 2008). It is argued that investment 
banks that had more experience in the new markets accumulated the necessary 
knowledge and thus were able to operate in a manner that was safer. One should note that 
investment banks are hierarchical in nature. Hierarchical organizations are particularly 
effective for building and combining knowledge, and thereby developing “path 
dependent” capabilities and knowledge assets (Eisenhardt & Santos, 2001). A firm's 
distinctive competencies and capabilities are important sources o f value creation over 
time (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). As such, it is expected that
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investment banks that diversified after deregulation into new markets lacked expertise in 
such markets and therefore would be subject to higher risks.
Hypothesis 5. Investment banks that were more diversified, will assume more 
corporate risk.
One outcome of deregulation (as discussed earlier) was the entry o f banks into 
real estate market due to the growth in these markets. Investment bank entry into these 
markets was usually through the launch of or investment in real estate investment trusts 
(REITs) (Frank & Ghosh, 2012; Gyamfi-Yeboah, Ling, & Naranjo, 2012). Knowledge 
can be a source of a firm’s competitive advantage (Berman, Down, & Hill, 2002; 
Dunning, 2001), and banks that were diversified into (and had knowledge of real estate) 
would enjoy competitive advantage. However, many of the firms that had diversified 
into real estate investments within investment banking did not possess knowledge of real 
estate, therefore it is expected that they would be taking on more risk. This is clear from 
evidence that some investment banks that have had operations with securities related to 
real estate for a long time, had accumulated knowledge and better understanding o f that 
particular market (Chang & Chan, 2011).
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Hypothesis 6. Investment banks that were diversified into diversified REIT9, will 
assume more corporate risk, as compared to investment banks that were not.
2.5.3 Knowledge is 'Sticky'
Alfred Marshal, in his comparison of nations, suggested that economic activity 
was drawn to regions rich in the “atmosphere” of knowledge (Marshall, 1920). Search for 
knowledge spillovers made substantial success by finding statistical evidence that 
companies’ productivity was linked if those companies were near outstanding universities 
and other sources o f scientific discovery -  geographically-localized spillovers of 
knowledge (Zucker, Darby, & Armstrong, 1998a). Geographically-localized knowledge 
spillovers were flourishing near great universities, but the presence o f outstanding 
scientists as measured by research productivity was a crucial factor over, above and 
independent from the presence o f those schools and availability o f government research 
funding to them (Zucker, Darby, & Brewer, 1998b). Those outstanding researchers called 
‘stars’ are the scientists who are capable of inventing and commercializing 
breakthroughs, and by living in a particular place, they create a geographically-localized 
knowledge cluster.
Neo-institutional theory suggests that by being in close proximity to universities 
where forward-looking research is taking place, employees o f local companies will be the
9 REIT stands for real estate investment trust, or a business entity deriving value from securities 
or derivatives whose underlying value is a function o f the value o f  real estate.
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first to be exposed to important discoveries and thus be able to use them before others 
(Zucker et al., 1998b). In a similar fashion, knowledge containing dynamic capabilities 
will be preserved near places with a high concentration of corporate headquarters. One 
of the limitations of Zucker’s model (1998) is that breakthrough information is treated as 
a public good, when in reality it may not be so.
Evidence that knowledge is “sticky,” and stays restrained within narrow spatial 
borders, led to the conclusion that plant locations can serve as a major source of 
competitive advantage, and companies located in innovative regions had better access to 
new technological knowledge than their spatially remote counterparts (Almeida, 1996; 
Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993).
A contrasting view is that existence o f agglomeration economies will motivate top 
firms not to geographically cluster, because companies contribute to and benefit from the 
externality in different ways (Shaver & Flyer, 2000). This implies that if companies are 
heterogeneous, their net benefit from agglomeration will vary (Chung & Kalnins, 2001). 
Therefore, large companies possessing best technologies, human resources, suppliers and 
distributors will have an incentive to locate distant from other companies, while smaller 
companies are likely to agglomerate (Deeds & Decarolis, 1999).
Reexamination of the empirical evidence on the level of spatial spillover between 
research works o f universities and high-technology innovations supported the view that 
knowledge is geographically-localized (Anselin, Varga, & Acs, 1997). Anselin et al. 
(1997) examined the potential for gravity and covering indices including Jaffe’s 
"geographical coincidence index," and argued that there is strong evidence o f local
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spillovers even at a state level. The tacit nature of knowledge leads to technological 
opportunity suggesting that the suitability o f knowledge is a key element for the location 
of innovation (Feldman, 2000). All this evidence on knowledge stickiness led researchers 
to conclude that innovative regions can serve as “magnets” to new investments (Almeida 
& Kogut, 1999).
2.5.4 Types o f Knowledge and Time Element
Studies of organizational knowledge systems have distinguished between 
component and architectural knowledge (Tallman, Jenkins, Henry, & Pinch, 2004). 
Component knowledge refers to physical aspects of technologies, while architectural 
knowledge refers to links and connections between these aspects (Finneran, 1999; 
Henderson & Clark, 1990b). Architectural knowledge contains dynamic capabilities and 
Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) even termed them ‘architectural competence’ (Please refer 
to Appendix B). Capabilities are composed of two main knowledge related parts: (1) a 
company-specific part and (2) an enhancement of other resources part. The spillovers of 
company-specific knowledge are beneficial when companies are very similar, or when 
competitors engage in business intelligence, and a high quantity o f company-specific 
information is used as a competitive tool for strategic decision-making (Liautaud, 2000; 
Luhn, 2010).
Increasing knowledge intensity, which can be manifested in capacity for R&D, 
has been underlined as one of the differentiating features o f the modem competitive
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landscape (Bettis & Hitt, 1995; Teece, 1982). The primary goal o f R&D is to generate 
new knowledge by recombining knowledge that exists (Fleming, 2001; Henderson & 
Cockbum, 1994; Kogut & Zander, 1992). Geographically-localized spillover effects of 
local universities on the prosperity of nearby enterprise R&D efforts was found to be 
positive and significant (Jaffe, 1989).
“Soft” versus “hard” knowledge within investment banks is pertinent to other 
business functions such as R&D, where informal, also called “soft,” information 
exchanges are crucial (Jaffe et al., 1993). The division between soft and hard information 
is significant in the incentives literature, providing clarification for the division of 
management and production. Namely, division is possibly a commitment device to 
examine the agent less intensively and increase his initiative (Aghion & Tirole, 1997). 
White-collar networking of investment bankers with consultants and lawyers consists of 
information intensive exchanges, which are further examples o f “soft” information 
(Holmes, 2005; Holmes & Stevens, 2004). For exchanges o f “hard,” or easily codified, 
information, such as financial reports or various statistical measures, geographic distance 
or industry experience is not an essential factor (Cremer, Garicano, & Prat, 2004; 
Glaeser, 1999). On the other hand, for exchanges of “soft” information, which contains 
industry-specific routines, time is highly important, because it is nearly impossible to 
codify that information and make it available for quick transfer. Thus, over time, it is 
expected that exchange of “soft” information would increase expertise o f investment 
banks in real estate markets.
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Hypothesis 7. Longer duration o f  diversification into diversified REIT by 
investment banks will be negatively associated with corporate risk.
Knowledge reconfigurations can be within, across or outside o f organizational 
borders (Katila, 2002; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). Relocations of corporate headquarters 
serve the desire by organizations’ management to tap into the knowledge 
reconfigurations outside of organizational borders. Various aspects o f knowledge used in 
reconfiguration can lead to distinct technological capabilities resulting in different levels 
of performance (Arthur, 1989; Stuart & Podolny, 1996; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997b). 
Research on R&D suggests that companies where research is centralized pursue R&D 
that has greater impact on future technological discoveries and spans a wider range of 
technological domains than do companies where R&D activities are decentralized 
(Argyres & Silverman, 2004). When R&D alliance partners are direct competitors, they 
are more likely to restrict their joint activities to ‘pure’ R&D in final product markets. 
This is because rivals are particularly reluctant to adding cooperative marketing activities 
to their R&D collaborations, implying that the competitive consequences of market- 
related knowledge leakage are a significant concern (Oxley & Sampson, 2003). This 
suggests that knowledge which spans beyond R&D and contains dynamic capabilities is 
crucial to corporate success.
Research into the management issues o f integration o f various types of 
specialized knowledge has been from the new product development perspective (Nonaka 
& Takeuchi, 1995). While some innovations are the result o f new knowledge application,
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others are the result of reconfigurations o f existing knowledge to generate “architectural 
innovations” (Henderson & Cockbum, 1994; Henderson & Clark, 1990a). “Architectural 
innovations” are based on various dynamic capabilities, and relocations o f headquarters 
can provide the necessary environments, rich in “architectural innovations.”
2.6 Level IV: Corporate Governance and Agency Theory
One of the main theoretical perspectives that has received significant coverage in 
strategic management literature is agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). It has 
emerged out of works of Coase (1937) and Arrow (1965, 1971) as analysis of relations in 
economic systems under uncertainty and partial information. Findings and applications 
of agency theory are developed and used in research o f executive compensations 
(Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Belliveau, O'Reilly III, & Wade, 1996; Boyd, 1994), 
corporate governance mechanisms (Cuervo, 2002; Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994; Walsh 
& Kosnik, 1993), corporate risk (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 
1998), corporate performance (Brush, Bromiley, & Hendrickx, 2000; Donaldson & 
Davis, 1991; Li & Simerly, 1998), decisions to diversify corporations (Fox & Hamilton, 
1994; Kochhar, 1996; Krishnan, Miller, & Judge, 1997), and decisions to merge (Holl & 
Kyriazis, 1997; Lane, Cannella Jr, & Lubatkin, 1998; Reuer & Insead, 1997) . There are 
many more studies arguing that corporate governance has direct effects on company risk 
(Holm & Laursen, 2007; Lee & Yeh, 2004). Examples of changes to risk can be 
differences in decision-making when the CEO is or is not the chairman o f the board, and 
various perceptions by investors related to this phenomena (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 
1990). Global financial crisis risk management practices are becoming more imperative 
for top executives, because one of the reasons for the current crisis seem to be the lack of 
profound comprehension of risk in executive decision-making (Ladd, 2008; Lo, 2009). 
Massive failure of the largest and most sophisticated financial institutions in the United
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States has illustrated that corporate governance systems were ineffective in successful 
mitigation of risks (Bebchuk, 2008).
The origins of agency theory date back to the 1960s when economists studied 
risk-sharing behavior of individuals and groups (Eisenhardt, 1989a). The underlying 
premise of agency theory is that organizational life and behavior of individuals is rooted 
in self-interest (Hendry, 2005). Agency theory explains and attempts to resolve two 
problems that arise from principal-agent relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989a). The first o f the 
two problems includes agency problem, which takes place when: (1) there is a conflict 
between goals of the agent and the principal (Sappington, 1991), and costs of monitoring 
the agent's actions are high for the principal (Varian, 1990). This means that it is very 
hard for the principal to verify if  the agent is acting in the principal’s best interest 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). The second problem is the problem o f risk-sharing, which arises 
from the differences in risk tolerance levels between the agent and the principal (Grable, 
2000; Sung & Hanna, 1996). This means that even when the goals o f principal and agent 
are aligned, differences in risk tolerance levels would dictate different preferences in 
decision-making for principal and agent (Eisenhardt, 1989a). In an attempt to resolve 
these problems agency theory tries to design an optimal contract, which must be efficient 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). There are two main types of contracts: behavior-oriented contracts, 
including merit pay such as salaries (Sturges, Conway, Guest, & Liefooghe, 2005), and 
outcome-oriented contracts, including commissions, stock option packages and profit 
sharing arrangements (Ng, Maull, & Yip, 2009; Roth & O'Donnell, 1996).
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that there is natural conflict in all 
corporations -  the conflict of principal and agent. This conflict is caused by the
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separation of ownership from control, and this separation leads to opportunistic behavior 
of executives (Lie, 2005). Prevention of opportunistic behavior o f executives can be 
achieved via implementation of monitoring devices that ensure that managers do not 
ignore their fiduciary duty and act in the best interest o f the owners o f corporation (Lui, 
Wong, & Liu, 2009; Tripsas, Schrader, & Sobrero, 1995).
One of the main contributions of agency theory to organizational thinking is that 
it treats information as a commodity that can be bought and sold (Braunstein, 1981). 
Implications of the commodity-like nature o f information are that companies can invest 
in development o f information systems that will limit opportunism on behalf o f the agent 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). The next key contribution of agency theory, which treats 
organizations as entities with an uncertain future, is the risk implications for the future 
(Eisenhardt & Brown, 1998). Uncertainty in this context refers to the tradeoff between 
risk and reward and is unrelated to the ability of the corporation to plan (Eisenhardt & 
Brown, 1998). Barney and Ouchi (1986), under agency theory, emphasized how capital 
markets may affect the firm. Agency theory assumes the pursuit o f self-interest at the 
individual level and goal conflict at the organizational level (Eisenhardt, 1989b).
Since the analysis focuses on the contract between principal and agent, the theory 
tries to define the most efficient contract arrangement (Lyons, 1996). Rooted in 
economics, agency theory, according to Jensen (1983), developed along two directions: 
positivist and principal-agent. Both streams, as a unit of analysis, take the contract 
between a principal and an agent. Positivist agency theory focuses on defining situations 
where principal-agent conflict may take place and then prescribing governance 
mechanisms that will minimize agents’ self-serving behavior (Nilakant & Rao, 1994).
The positivist stream of research is less mathematical and focuses on the governance 
mechanism (Nilakant & Rao, 1994). The positivist stream was enhanced by researchers 
asking what the agency theory contributes to organizational theory, and the common 
solution is to identify the situation where interests of stockholders and executives do not 
align and then to show that information systems or outcome-based incentives solve the 
agency problem (Ross & Liu, 2009).
The principal-agent research stream employs abstract mathematics and logical 
proof of outcomes, and due to this mathematical rigor, this stream is less accessible to 
organizational scholars (Bhattacherjee, 1998). The focus of the principal-agent literature 
is on determining the optimal contract under different conditions and a multitude of 
assumptions that change with the levels o f uncertainty (Nilakant & Rao, 1994), risk 
aversion (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), and availability of information (Bamberg & 
Spremann, 1989). The principal-agent research stream is more directly focused on the 
contract between principal and agent, and the underlying assumption is that parties 
should choose the most efficient contract (Eisenhardt, 1989a). The common approach is 
to take a subset of agency variables like task programmability (Stroh, Brett, Baumann, & 
Reilly, 1996), sophistication of the information system (Eisenhardt, 1985; Gurbaxani & 
Whang, 1991), and outcome uncertainty to predict if the contract is behavior-based or 
outcome-based (Eisenhardt, 1988).
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2.6.1 Wider View on Agency Theory and its Links
Agency theory is linked with other theories in strategic management. Transaction 
cost economics and agency theory linked in the sense that agency problem increases 
certain transaction costs, and so acts as friction in the economic development (Beccerra & 
Gupta, 1999; Kim & Mahoney, 2005). Agency theory has many similarities with the 
transaction cost perspective (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1981, 1998). As noted by 
Barney and Ouchi (1986), the theories share assumptions o f self-interest and bounded 
rationality. They also have similar dependent variables; that is, hierarchies roughly 
correspond to behavior-based contracts, and markets correspond to outcome-based 
contracts. Examples o f transaction costs are costs of monitoring agents behavior (Frey, 
1993) and costs o f designing an optimal contract (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990).
Agency theory assumes that individuals are bounded rationally and that 
information is distributed asymmetrically (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967); they both use 
efficient processing of information as a criterion for choosing among various organizing 
forms (Galbraith, 1973). Thompson's (1967) and later Ouchi's (1979) linking means/ends 
relationships and focused goals to behavior versus outcome control is very similar to 
agency theory's linking task programmability and measurability of outcomes to contract 
form (Eisenhardt, 1985).
The main idea of the agency theory literature is that the separation o f ownership 
and control leads to opportunistic behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Most empirical 
studies in agency theory analyze the separation of ownership from management, using
secondary data that is available for larger corporations (Bass, Bass, & Bass, 2008). 
Empirical works provide support for the contract between the principal and an agent with
(a) information systems (Conlon & Parks, 1990; Eccles, 1983; Parks & Conlon, 1995),
(b) outcome uncertainty (Eisenhardt, 1985, 1988; Nilakant & Rao, 1994), (c) outcome 
measurability (Abrahamson & Park, 1994; Anderson, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1985), (d) time 
(Camevale & Conlon, 1988; Lafontaine, 1992), and (e) task programmability (Eccles, 
1983; Eisenhardt, 1985; Stroh et al., 1996). Moreover, this support rests on research using 
a variety of methods including questionnaires, secondary sources, laboratory 
experiments, and interviews. The common approach in these studies is to use a subset of 
agency variables such as task programmability, information systems, and outcome 
uncertainty to predict whether the contract is behavior- or outcome-based. The underlying 
assumption is that principals and agents will choose the most efficient contract, although 
efficiency is not directly tested (Eisenhardt, 1989a).
Agency theory is linked with new institutional economics because most principal- 
agent conflicts take place in settings where a principal-agent relationship exists, and one 
of such settings is investment banks (Williamson, 2000).
2.6.2 Board o f Directors Background
Agency theory portrays managers as agents who are self-interested and for that 
reason should be closely monitored (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
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Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). Agency theory suggests that boards o f directors 
influence strategic decision-making by preventing executives from acting selfishly at the 
expense of owners (Mizruchi, 1983). From this perspective, boards are not initiating and 
implementing strategies, but rather enhancing the welfare o f stockholders by endorsing 
and monitoring strategic decision-making (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Goodstein, Gautam, & 
Boeker, 1994; Jensen & Fama, 1983).
During the last several decades the corporate governance system worldwide has 
been undergoing a substantial change (Pugliese et al., 2009). First, the globalization of 
the world economy, then, the liberalization of financial systems, followed by numerous 
scandals involving board members, culminating in financial crisis, resulting in stronger 
accountability and transparency, have placed the functions o f the board of directors at the 
core of the corporate governance debate (Ingley & Van Der Walt, 2005; Ingley & Van 
der Walt, 2001; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). The appropriate level of involvement o f boards 
remains a question, even though society is pushing for increasing that involvement 
(Pugliese et al., 2009). In general, both scholars and practitioners recognize the 
importance of adequate board control and board independence (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 
1990; Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Westphal, 1998). However, when it comes to strategic 
decision-making, the level of optimal board involvement remains controversial (Daily, 
Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Golden & Zajac, 2001; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).
In the 1970s boards of directors in the United States were criticized for being 
passive and not preventing corporate failures (Pugliese et al., 2009). The public 
demanded that boards take a more active strategic role in order to restore confidence 
(Clendenin, 1972; Heller & Milton, 1972; Mace, 1976; Machin & Wilson, 1979; Pugliese
et al., 2009; Vance, 1979). This led to corporate governance reforms that brought board 
members closer to strategic decision-making (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 
Enrione, Mazza, & Zerboni, 2006; Sheridan, Jones, & Marston, 2006). As the power of 
institutional investors increased, boards were moved even closer to the strategic decision­
making aspect o f business (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & 
Grossman, 2002; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992b). For the first time in history, boards were 
starting to challenge CEOs and become even more involved in strategy, a purely CEO- 
dominated domain in the past (Monks, 2008; Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve, & Hu, 
2006; Ruigrok, Peck, & Keller, 2006). Over time, more and more studies suggest that 
board members are becoming more aware of their role in strategic decisions (Demb & 
Neubauer, 1992; Heracleous, 2001a, b; Huse, 2005). Yet, researchers pinpoint multiple 
disagreements in empirical studies and a wealth o f inconclusive evidence defining the 
relationship between boards and strategic decisions (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 
1998; Deutsch, 2005; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996). From one side of research 
works, boards were shown to be passive and at the mercy of CEOs’ dominance and 
executives’ decisions (Herman, 1981; Kosnik, 1987; Lorsch & Maclver, 1989; Mace, 
1971). There is also evidence that under certain conditions boards may demolish value 
when becoming involved directly in strategic decision-making (Fulghieri & Hodrick, 
2006; Hitt, Harrison, & Ireland, 2001; Jensen, 1993). Many scholars have shown that the 
role of the boards in strategic decision-making is becoming more active and involved 
(Ingley & Van Der Walt, 2005; Ravasi & Zattoni, 2006; Schmidt & Brauer, 2006; Zahra, 
1990; Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). There is also empirical evidence that boards defined 
certain elements o f strategic decision-making, some of which are: (1) the scope of the
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firm (Jensen & Zajac, 2004; Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003); (2) levels of 
innovative activities and entrepreneurship (Fried, Bruton, & Hisrich, 1998; Hoskisson et 
al., 2002; Zahra, Neubaum, & Huse, 2000); (3) strategic transformations and adjustments 
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Filatotchev & Toms, 2003; Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 
1993); (4) strategies for research and development (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991; 
Kor, 2006); and (5) corporate internationalization (Datta, Rajagopalan, & Zhang, 2003; 
Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). The above empirical inconclusiveness makes including 
boards in this study even more interesting.
2.6.4 Size of the Board o f Directors
Size of the board of directors simply means the number o f people on the board 
(Judge & Zeithaml, 1992b), and this structural variable has been studied extensively with 
ambiguous findings (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Group dynamics literature provides some 
answers for this ambiguity. It is empirically shown that large groups may suffer from 
difficulties with group organization, group control (Hackman & Morris, 1974, 1983) and 
overall low motivation (Herold, 1979). Increases in group size are negatively associated 
with participation of group members (Gladstein, 1984). This result was replicated in a 
business setting in a study of Fortune 500 boards, where larger boards were found to be 
too bulky for effective communication and discussion (Herman, 1981). An analogous 
finding was with hospital boards, where larger ones were ineffective and delayed the 
speed of strategic decision-making (Kovner, 1985). Decision-making speed was
increased while individual commitment o f members was substantially reduced in 
oversized boards (Lauenstein, 1977; Reed, 1978). Other studies pointed out that it is more 
costly for large boards to monitor growth (Jensen, 1993). Similarly, board size was 
shown to be negatively related to growth opportunities (Lehn, Patro, & Zhao, 2009). 
Board size and independence decrease with the cost of monitoring and advising (Linck, 
Netter, & Yang, 2008). In personal interviews of 114 board members accompanied by 
archival data, board size was negatively related to the board’s involvement, while board 
involvement was positively related to financial performance (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992a). 
Thus, board size may slow down active participation by members o f the board, reduce 
effectiveness of strategic decision-making, and have a generally negative effect on group 
dynamics; for that very reason, risk-taking tendencies are argued to increase.
Hypothesis 8. The size o f  the boards o f  directors o f  investment banks will be
positively associated with corporate risk-taking.
2.6.4 Board of Directors Interlocks
Why did board interlocks matter in investment banking? Social network ties, 
including board interlock ties, channel social influence as well as information (Burt, 
1995; Davis, 1991; Walker, 1985). More connected boards are exposed to more 
knowledge, political power, and more pressure for higher performance (Hillman, 2005;
Pennings, 1980). In the literature interlocking ties and firm performance had either: (1) 
no association (Pennings, 1980), (2) positive association (Berkowitz, Carrington, 
Kotowitz, & Waverman, 1979; Burt, 1983), or (3) negative association (Fligstein & 
Brantley, 1992). The study of total quality management-related innovations in public 
hospitals demonstrated that both top executives and their networks determine whether 
companies adopt innovative strategy (Young, Chams, & Shortell, 2001). Interlocking 
directorships are the essence o f strategic power increases. These connections allow 
companies to align with other powerful entities in their environment. These connections 
also permit access to specific knowledge that is circulated in top management teams of 
other companies, and presence of that knowledge creates an illusion that board members 
are more aware o f trends and can make better decisions. Board members who are 
interlocked extensively are able to make comparisons between the companies on board of 
which they sit. Thus, not only interlocking connections provide information, they also put 
pressure on the board members to push the company to perform better.
Hypothesis 9. Investment banks with more interlocked boards will be associated
with higher corporate risk-taking.
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2.6.5 Board o f Directors Shares and Voting Power
A board of directors with more voting power will have stronger influence over 
corporate strategy, including corporate risk (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Zald, 1969).
Hypothesis 10. Voting power o f  board members o f  investment banks will be
negatively associated with corporate risk-taking.
Ownership of the stock by various groups is a powerful form o f corporate 
governance (Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010). Ownership structure allows 
either aligning or misaligning the interests of various stakeholder groups (Daily et al.,
2003). The relationship between the ownership of the stock of top executives and 
organizational performance usually shows that firms with larger ownership do not 
outperform firms with lower ownership. Ownership of the stock by the board of directors 
can be an effective antitakeover tactic and depending on the situation can support either 
agency or stewardship theories (Malekzedeh, McWilliams, & Sen, 2011). It is argued that 
board ownership influences corporate strategy, firm performance and governance 
processes (Connelly et al., 2010). More specifically ownership o f the stock by board 
members is perceived by investors as an indicator o f companies long-term earnings 
(Certo, Covin, Daily, & Dalton, 2001). Therefore,
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Hypothesis 11. Ownership o f  stock by board members o f  investment banks will
be positively associated with corporate risk-taking.
2.6.6 Insiders on Board o f Directors
The ratio of insider representation on the board is by far the most widely used 
variable in corporate governance (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992b). Insiders are defined as 
“board members who are current or former employees of a firm or who are otherwise 
closely affiliated with the firm” (Cochran, Wood, & Jones, 1985). Over the last few 
decades society put pressure on corporations to limit the number o f insider directors on 
the boards, assuming the outsiders perform monitoring and oversight functions better 
(Judge & Zeithaml, 1992b). Some researchers provided evidence that the number of 
insiders on the boards decreased from 31 percent in 1980 to 21 percent in 1989 (Heidrick 
& Struggles, 1990). Scholars observing this decline mostly speculated on how insider 
representation impacts the behavior o f the boards, and empirical results were mostly 
ambiguous (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Some researchers argued that insiders benefit boards 
by being more aware of valuable information and insights and bringing them to the 
board’s discussions (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). Other scholars argued that there 
should be a balance between informed discussants o f strategic choices and impartial 
monitors of strategic decision-making (Rosenstein, 1987). Further, there is some
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empirical evidence in the literature suggesting that there should be internal balance. No 
study analyzed how number of insiders is associated with corporate risk-taking.
Analysis of Inc. 500 companies’ suggested that insider representation was 
positively related to board involvement in the strategic decision-making process (Ford, 
1988). Higher ratio of insiders was positively correlated with involvement o f the board in 
strategic planning, thus making strategic planning more effective (Lauenstein, Tashakori, 
& Boulton, 1983). Higher ratio of insiders is positively associated with levels of strategic 
change (Goodstein & Boeker, 1991), levels of R&D expenses in the company (Baysinger 
et al., 1991), and levels of strategic innovativeness (Hill & Snell, 1988). Ratio of insiders 
was negatively associated with number o f cases when golden parachute strategies were 
used in Fortune 500 companies (Cochran et al., 1985) and with quality o f strategic 
decision-making (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992b). All these empirical works argue that 
improved information flows that higher numbers of insiders provide make boards of 
directors more effective in some cases while less effective in others. Unlike outsiders 
who may not be as directly impacted by firm performance and failure, insiders’ closer 
ties to firm outcomes may be make them more risk averse. Overall, I expect that 
increased number of insiders will lower firm risk:
Hypothesis 12. Number o f  insiders on board o f investment banks will be 




A sample o f financial institutions was obtained from Thomson One Financial 
database. Initially, data representing Security Brokers and Dealers was extracted, this 
data set corresponds to SIC code 621 (Security Brokers and Dealers) and the set includes 
135 publicly traded United States-based companies. A larger set o f 267 companies 
corresponding to SIC10 code 62 (Security and Commodity Brokers) was also retrieved 
and analyzed. However, after preliminary analysis, a data set based on GIC codes was 
extracted from Thomson One Financial Database. GIC11 code, being a newer and more 
advanced classification system (Boni & Womack, 2006), seemed to deliver a cleaner set. 
In GIC set under the umbrella code of 40 (Financials) the database produces 1507 
publicly traded companies. This set included a subset o f interest for this study called 
Diversified Financials that consists of 252 publicly traded companies with database code 
4020. The set Diversified Financials, in turn, consists o f three subsets: (1) a subset o f  50
10 The Standard Industrial Classification was replaced by the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) starting in 1997, but several data sets are still available with SIC- 
based data. Both SIC and NAICS classify establishments by their primary type of activity.
" The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) is an industry taxonomy developed by 
MSCI and Standard & Poor's (S&P) for use by the global financial community. The GICS 
structure consists of 10 sectors, 24 industry groups, 68 industries and 154 sub-industries into 
which S&P has categorized all major public companies. The system is similar to ICB (Industry 
Classification Benchmark), a classification structure maintained by Dow Jones Indexes and FTSE 
Group. GICS is used as a basis for S&P and MSCI financial market indexes in which each 
company is assigned to a sub-industry, and to a corresponding industry, industry group and 
sector, according to the definition of its principal business activity. "GICS" is a registered 
trademark of McGraw-Hill and is currently assigned to S&P.
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corresponding to Diversified Financial Services with code 402010; (2) a subset o f 63 
corresponding to Consumer Finance with code 402020; and (3) a subset of 135 
companies corresponding to Capital Markets with database code 402030. GIC codes, due 
to being a later development, are generally more logical (Boni & Womack, 2006), have 
more consistent ways in naming categories, and, therefore, analysis proceeded with the 
set produced by applying GIC codes. During analysis, instead of analyzing only 402030 
Capital Markets, which are investment banks, a larger set o f 4020 Diversified Financials 
was analyzed as well, yet controversial results suggested that investment banks have 
systematic differences from other types of financial institutions, and that differences 
cannot be accounted for by means of statistical methods. The final data set included 135 
publicly traded investment banks that operate in the United States (please see Appendix 
C).
The sample for the corporate governance part o f the analysis included 47 
variables pulled from Directors Legacy and Risk Matrix databases under Wharton 
Research Data Services (WRDS). Board of directors’ data was available for 2007 to 2010 
for only 41 publicly traded investment banks out o f  the sample of 135 the was produced 
by Thomson Reuters Financial (please see Appendix E). Data for all three years was 
available for 38 investment banks only, and the largest number o f observations was 
recorded for the year 2008.
All investment banks in both samples are publicly traded banks. Inclusion of 
private investment banks would make this study much more interesting; however, most 
investment banks that are private very rarely disclose financial information and 
information on board members (Eccles & Crane, 1988; Servaes & Zenner, 1996).
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3.2 Variables and Measures
Research in strategic management was criticized for poor construct measurement 
(Boyd, Gove, & Hitt, 2005), and, for this reason, for every theoretical perspective more 
than one indicator variable was used; the smallest number is two and the largest is five.
The variables of interest to this study are the corporate risk-taking variable, which 
is the dependent variable, and it is standard deviation of free cash flow. Independent 
variables include: (1) a deregulation dummy, which was coded as 0 before deregulation 
and 1 after deregulation, (2) a deregulation clock variable, that is, an ordinal variable, 
corresponding to the number of years since deregulation was introduced; (3) corporate 
aspirations as average of the past five years; (4) corporate aspirations as industry average, 
i.e. arithmetic mean; (5) diversification as measured with entropy measure; (6) 
knowledge of real estate with a dummy, (7) clock variable o f time in the real estate, as 
number of years in that industry; (8) number of interlocking directorships as a sum of all 
interlocks in the board; (9) ownership of the stock as the ratio o f the total number of 
shares owned by board members to the total stock outstanding; (10) voting power of 
directors as a sum of voting of stocks; (11) ratio o f insiders as a percentage of insiders in 
the board; (12) board size as a count of people in the board.
Banking regulation strictness is measured by the index developed by researchers 
at IMF12 (Abiad, Detragiache, & Tressel, 2009). Their index was composed to measure 
five dimensions of regulations in banks: (1) interest rate controls; (2) credit controls; (3)
12 International Monetary Fund
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restrictions of competition; (4) state ownership; and (5) supervision of banks. While this 
deregulation variable is more versatile, it is not available for investment banks, and is 
used within the umbrella o f the World Bank primarily for state banks’ analysis.
Introduction of financial deregulation was coded using a dummy variable, and it 
is a common way to account for deregulation (Kotha & Nair, 1995; Mezias, 1990; 
Winship & Mare, 1984). Mezias (1990) in his study of applied economic models versus 
institutional models used dummy variables extensively. A total of seven dummy variables 
were used to account for different time periods of Fortune 200 companies switching from 
the deferral method of accounting to the flow-through method from 1962 to 1984. The 
dummy variable to account for time was used in the analysis of the Japanese machine 
tool industry over 1979 to 1992 (Kotha & Nair, 1995). In that paper, to account for 
introduction of the “voluntary restraint agreement” between the United States and Japan, 
Kotha and Nair (1995) used the dummy variable. Deregulation was coded as a dummy 
variable in other papers, accounting for it as either pre-deregulation or post-deregulation 
dummy (Beck et al., 2010; Demyanyk et al., 2007; Reger et al., 1992; Stiroh & Strahan, 
2003). Based on all o f these studies deregulation was coded as a dummy variable, pre­
deregulation was coded as zero and post-deregulation was coded as one. Along with this, 
a clock variable was also used.
Control variables include the size of investment banks measured as In o f assets, 
market capitalization and number o f employees of the bank. The first variable is 
calculated, while the second one is available at Thomson Reuters one.
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Board of directors variables were downloaded from Directors Legacy dataset in 
WRDS database. Number of interlocks was a mathematical sum of individual directors’ 
presence on other companies’ boards. The number of interlocks ranged from zero to 
twenty four. Bank Of America Corporation, Bank O f Hawaii Corporation, Bank O f New 
York Mellon Corporation, First Commonwealth Financial Corporation, and SEI 
Investments Company had zero interlocks, while Northern Trust Corp had the largest 
number of twenty four interlocks in the board. Average number of interlocks was 8.61.
The data on the number o f directors in the board was extracted from Directors 
Legacy dataset in WRDS. The number of directors in the boards varied between seven 
and twenty, for the year 2007, and seven and seventeen for the year 2010. The average 
number o f board members declined from 12.28 in 2007 to 11.66 in 2010, in fact it 
seemed that financial crisis was correlated with the decline o f the number of directors in 
the board.
Voting power of directors was an arithmetic sum o f the voting power of each 
director individually. The voting power of boards ranged from zero to 34%. Franklin 
Resources Inc had the board of directors with the largest voting power. The number of 
investment banks where boards had zero voting power ranged from year to year and was 
six in 2007, twenty two in 2008, eighteen in 2009 and 2010.
Ownership of the stock data was available as the number of shares that each 
director possessed. Total number o f shares for the board was calculated as an arithmetic 
sum. Because every company has different number of shares outstanding, the percentage 
of shares holdings by the board of directors was calculated. The data for the total number
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of shares outstanding was downloaded from Reuters stock screen website13, and numbers 
were cross referenced with EquitiesTracher.com14 and Yahoo/Finance15. The ownership 
of the company shares ranged from 0.16% in the board of the Regions Financial 
Corporation to 36.48% at the board of the Franklin Resources Inc. The average 
ownership of shares by the boards of directors in the sample of 42 investment banks was 
5.19%.
The ratio o f independent directors was traced from board affiliation data. In the 
database each director can have several affiliations, including being (1) independent; (2) 
employed by the company; (3) being linked to the board in some other way, like having 
family relations; and (4) being not ascertainable. The number of independent directors 
was calculated as an arithmetic sum, and then the ratio of independent directors on the 
boards was computed as a percentage. Presence of independent directors ranged from 
50% to 94%. The lowest number o f independent directors was at Raymond James 
Financial Inc. The highest number of independent directors was at Suntrust Banks Inc. 
Other banks with high ration of independent directors include US Bancorporation with 
92%, Northern Trust Corporation with 92%, JP Morgan Chase & Company with 91%, 
Intercontinental Exchange Inc with 90%, and Comerica Inc with 90%. The average 
number of independent directors in the dataset was 75.32%.
13 From <http://www.reuters.eom/finance/stocks/overview7svmboNSEIC.Q> accessed on 
05/18/2012 at 11:34
14 From < http://www.equitiestracker.com/> accessed on 05/16/2012 at 9:12
15 From < http://finance.vahoo.com/q?s=AMP&ql=l> accessed on 05/16/2012 at 10:44
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3.3 Data Analysis
All the analysis was performed on PASW Statistics16 18. Institutional theory was 
tested using ANOVA. Due to the fact that deregulation affected all the banks at the same 
time regression could not been used. The results o f the ANOVA suggest that deregulation 
had no effect on corporate risk taking. And this is a surprising result. In fact it was such a 
surprise, that results were retested using standard deviation of Earnings, standard 
deviation of Earnings Before Interest And Taxes, standard deviation of Earnings Before 
Taxes And Depreciation (Please see the results in Table 3). All these variables are similar 
to free cash flow and are used extensively to measure corporate risk-taking, even though 
free cash flow is considered to be a more accurate measure, because it cannot be 
manipulated as easily as earnings related measures. All the tests were not significant, and 
the only conclusion was that deregulation had no immediate effect on corporate risk 
taking.
Board of directors’ data was analyzed using multiple linear regressions. The 
analysis included lag element, when dependent variable was one year after independent 
variable (Please see the results in Table 4). Strong support was found for hypothesis nine 
and partial support was found for hypothesis twelve. Year 2007 was an exception, none 
of the results were significant and no hypotheses were supported. The reason for this may 
be the fact that current financial crisis started in 2007 and there was a lot o f havoc on the 
market. Examination of data showed that year 2007 had only 27 valid cases, while years 
2008, 2009 and 2010 had 42 valid cases each. For the year 2008, significant results were
16 Also called SPSS
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found for the size of the board. And when the lag was used, results were significant for 
the board size and the ratio of insiders. For the year 2009 and 2010, significant results 
were for the board size and ratio of insiders, while when lag was used, the significant 
results were found for the board size only. These results suggest that board size 
determines corporate risk taking all the time and ratio o f insiders half o f the time. The 
number of interlocks on the boards were not significant in any of the eight tests reported 
and in twenty regressions that were performed in total. Stock ownership was highly 
correlated with voting rights and both were not statistically significant throughout the 
tests.
To test cumulative effect of different theories a model including two variables for 
agency theory, three variables for knowledge based view and two variables for behavioral 
theory of the firm was constructed. The number o f independent variables was seven, and 
for years 2008, 2009, and 2010 the number of observations was 42. This is within the 
guidelines of multivariate data analysis, which prescribes that the data set should be at 
least five times as large as the number o f independent variables in the model (Hair, 
Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). Hair et al (2006) argued that for statistically 
significant results, the minimum data set for the model with seven independent variables 
will be thirty five or higher.
85
4 RESULTS
Results of this study indicate that deregulation by itself might not have had an 
impact on the corporate risk-taking, however, it created opportunities to take bigger 
corporate-risks which many banks started to exploit. Those banks that were taking more 
risk were performing better and that created peer pressure, which was measured as 
aspirations based on industry. Those aspirations had statistically significant results 
however, in year 2010 the sign of the relationship changed. Results o f full model suggest 
that in years 2008 and 2009 it was imitative behavior that led to high corporate risk- 
taking. Evidence of this comes from aspirations based on peers’ variable, called 
Aspirations Industry Average, was significant. In year 2010, aspirations based on 
industry average variable again was significant but it reversed the sign. This finding 
suggests that during times of crisis and market decline, years 2008 and 2009 in the 
model, aspirations based on peer pressure push companies to act in established ways, 
those who have positive aspirations, i.e. perform worse than average are prone to take 
more risk. In fact, as performance deviates from the average, the propensity to increase 
corporate risk-taking goes up. At the same time, companies with negative aspirations, i.e. 
companies that are outperforming the industry are not inclined to pursue strategies with 
higher corporate risk-taking. However, when market decline stopped and recovery 
started, that is years 2010 and 2011 in the model, companies that were performing better 
than the industry before, and thus were exhibiting low levels of corporate risk-taking 
changed their strategies and started to demonstrate more aggressive corporate risk-taking. 
Data suggests that after the crisis, better performing companies, push the limits of 
corporate risk-taking, while companies that struggled through the crisis, pursue very safe 
strategies with low corporate risk-taking. Another explanation may be the fact that
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government was involved with many investment banks that were on the verge o f going 
bankrupt and thus forced them to play safe. Also, TARP money was offered to many 
banks, including the ones that performed well during the crisis, thus encouraging 
management to use low cost capital and take more risk.
An interesting finding o f the full model was that diversification argument was 
partially supported and showed that more diversified investment banks had lower 
corporate risk-taking levels. An explanation for this might be that highly diversified 
banks operate in many lines of business outside of investment banking, while the 
dependent variable, standard deviation of free cash flow, was measuring free cash flow 
for the bank as a whole and not distinguishing across different businesses. Portfolio effect 
of large number of businesses has a smoothing effect on income streams, free cash flows 
and reported earnings (Skinner & Sloan, 2002).
Size of the board was negatively related to the corporate risk-taking, which is a 
finding that goes against the conventional wisdom that large boards have weaker 
communication (Herman, 1981), worse participation of the members (Gladstein, 1984), 
longer decision-making speeds (Kovner, 1985), worse board involvement levels (Judge & 
Zeithaml, 1992b), decrease levels of monitoring and advising (Linck et al., 2008), and 
provide weaker growth opportunities (Lehn et al., 2009). Data suggests that large boards 
lead to lower corporate risk-taking. One reason for this finding may be the fact that larger 
boards take longer to make decisions; so many risky decisions are postponed or never 
made. Another explanation may be the fact that when you have a large group of people, 
probability that someone has a low risk tolerance level in that group increases. One 
person with a low risk-tolerance level in the group can block risky decisions and thus 
lead to lower corporate risk-taking. Ownership of the stock by the board members did not 
yield significant results in the model.
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Ratio of insiders on the board was negatively correlated throughout board of 
directors model and full model. The relationship was significant and negative for years 
2008, 2009 and 2010. This finding suggests that larger number o f insiders actually 
reduces corporate risk-taking. One possible explanation may be the fact that insiders 
possess more knowledge about the company and so are able to make better decisions that 
lead to reduction in corporate risk-taking. Another explanation may be the nature o f the 
job security o f insiders. Job security o f insiders depends on the risk-level o f the 
corporation where they work, so there is a direct incentive to make company safer, and 
thus reduce corporate risk-taking.
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5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study adds to the discussion of corporate risk-taking behavior and asserts that 
risk-taking by firms is due to multiple factors and we need to develop more complex 
models to capture effects of all the factors. Comprehensive approach used in this study 
with different levels of analysis, covering institutional environment or macro level, and 
firm environment or micro level showed that variables from both levels play into 
corporate risk-taking and at different times effects o f those variables might have different 
magnitude or change the directions. Theoretical contributions o f this work include 
analyzing corporate risk-taking phenomena with multiple prisms and methods.
This study provides empirical evidence against the conventional notion 
established in the media that current financial crisis was solely due to deregulation of 
investment banking. In fact, findings suggest that deregulation had no immediate effect 
on corporate risk-taking, but rather created an environment with many opportunities. That 
environment full of opportunities also had peer pressure. It was peer pressure o f other 
investment banks and imitative behavior after “high status” banks that lead to aspirations 
and eventually to excessive corporate risk-taking. Interestingly, aspirations based on 
banks own past, were not contributing to the levels of corporate risk-taking. 
Counterintuitive results were found for the size o f the boards of directors, which, while 
bring many inefficiencies in decision making acts as a reducing factor for corporate risk- 
taking.
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Path dependent knowledge of a particular industry or type of security, like CDOs, 
according to the data had no effect on corporate risk-taking, while size o f the board of 
directors had a pronounced effect. Results suggest that, while larger boards may be 
ineffective and expensive to run, they lead to lower corporate risk-taking. This 
dissertation also combined two types o f aspirations into one model, and empirical 
evidence suggested that aspirations based on peers are more powerful predictors of 
corporate risk-taking behavior than aspirations based on past performance. According to 
data, both presence and duration of the presence of specific knowledge of real estate 
securities that accumulates over time did not have effect on corporate risk-taking.
Overall, results support the idea that corporate risk-taking is a multidimensional 
concept and needs to be studied from several perspectives.
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Figure 2. Knowledge base and capabilities.
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APPENDIX C
Table 1. The list of 135 Publicly Traded Investment Banks in the Large Sample
# Entity Name Quote Symbol
1 AB Watley Group Inc ABWG-5
2 Alliance Financial Corp. ALNC-O
3 Alliancebemstein Holding Limited Partne AB-N
4 Ameriprise Financial Inc AMP-N
5 Arlington Asset Investment Corp. AI-N
6 Banctrust Financial Group Inc BTFG-O
7 Bank Of America Corp. BAC-N
8 Bank Of Hawaii Corp. BOH-N
9 Bank Of New York Mellon Corp. BK-N
10 Berkshire Hills Bancorp Inc BHLB-O
11 BGC Partners Inc BGCP-0
12 Blackrock Inc BLK-N
13 Capital Financial Holdings Inc CPFH-U
14 Century Bancorp Inc CNBKA-0
15 Charles Schwab Corp. SCHW-N
16 Chemung Financial Corp. CHMG-U
17 Cigna Corp. CI-N
18 Citigroup Inc C-N
19 Citizens Republic Bancorp Inc CRBC-0
20 City Capital Corp. CTCC-5
21 City National Corp. CYN-N
22 Cobiz Financial Inc COBZ-O
23 Comerica Inc CMA-N
24 Commerce Bancshares Inc CBSH-O
25 Community Bank System Inc CBU-N
26 Cowen Group Inc COWN-O
27 Cross Timbers Royalty Trust CRT-N
28 Crown Financial Holdings Inc CFGI-5
29 Cullen Frost Bankers Inc CFR-N
30 Duff & Phelps Corp. DUF-N
31 E* trade Financial Corp. ETFC-0
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32 Eastbridge Investment Group Corp. EBIG-U
33 Eastern Virginia Bankshares Inc EVBS-O
34 Edelman Financial Group Inc EF-O
35 Endovasc Inc EVSC-5
36 Evercore Partners Inc EVR-N
37 FBR & Company FBRC-0
38 Federated Investors Inc FII-N
39 Fifth Third Bancorp FITB-O
40 First Bancorp FBP-N
41 First Busey Corp. BUSE-0
42 First Citizens Bancshares Inc FCNCA-O
43 First Citizens Bancshares Inc FIZN-5
44 First Commonwealth Financial Corp FCF-N
45 First Community Corp. FCCO-O
46 First Horizon National Corp. FHN-N
47 First M & F Corp. FMFC-O
48 First Mid-Illinois Bancshares Inc FMBH-U
49 First Montauk Financial Corp. FMFN-5
50 First Niagara Financial Group Inc FNFG-O
51 Franklin Resources Inc BEN-N
52 Fulton Financial Corp. FULT-O
53 Fxcm Inc FXCM-N
54 Gain Capital Holdings Inc GCAP-N
55 Gamco Investors Inc GBL-N
56 German American Bancorp Inc GABC-O
57 GFI Group Inc GFIG-N
58 Gilman Ciocia Inc GTAX-5
59 Gleacher & Company Inc GLCH-O
60 Global Capital Partners Inc GCPL-5
61 Great Northern Iron Ore Properties GNI-N
62 Greenhill & Company Inc GHL-N
63 Heartland Financial USA Inc HTLF-0
64 Heritage Financial Group Inc HBOS-O
65 Huntington Bancshares Inc HBAN-O
66 Imperial Credit Industries Inc ICII-5
67 Interactive Brokers Group Incorporation IBKR-O
68 Intercontinental Exchange Inc ICE-N
69 International Fcstone Inc INTL-0
70 Investment Technology Group ITG-N
1 2 2
71 Investors Capital Holdings Limited ICH-A
72 Iron Mining Group Inc IRNNQ-5
73 Jacksonville Bancorp Inc JXSB-O
74 Janel World Trade Limited JLWT-U
75 Jefferies Group Inc JEF-N
76 Jesup & Lamont Inc JLIC-5
77 JMP Group Inc JMP-N
78 Jordan American Holdings Inc JAHI-5
79 JP Morgan Chase & Company JPM-N
80 KBW Inc KBW-N
81 Kent Financial Services Inc KENT-5
82 Kentucky Bancshares Inc KTYB-U
83 Keycorp KEY-N
84 KKR Financial Holdings LLC KFN-N
85 Knight Capital Group Inc KCG-N
86 Ladenburg Thalman Financial Services LTS-A
87 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc LEHMQ-5
88 LPL Investment Holdings Inc LPLA-O
89 M & T Bank Corp. MTB-N
90 Macatawa Bank Corp. MCBC-O
91 Marketaxess Holdings Inc M KTX-0
92 Merriman Holdings Inc MERR-5
93 MF Global Holdings Limited MFGLQ-5
94 Morgan Stanley MS-N
95 Momingstar Inc MORN-O
96 National Holdings Corp. NHLD-U
97 Network 1 Financial Group Inc NTFL-U
98 North State Bankcorp NSBC-U
99 Northern Trust Corp. NTRS-O
100 Oppenheimer Holdings Inc OPY-N
101 Oregon Pacific Bancorp ORPB-U
102 Oriental Financial Group Inc OFG-N
103 Paulson Capital Corp. PLCC-O
104 Penns Woods Bancorp Inc PWOD-O
105 Penson Worldwide Inc PNSN-O
106 Peoples Bancorp Inc PEBO-O
107 Peoples Bancorp Inc PEBC-5
108 Peoples United Financial Inc PBCT-O




























Piper Jaffray Companies PJC-N
PNC Financial Services Group Inc PNC-N
Potomac Bancshares Inc PTBS-U
Premier West Bancorp PRWT-O
Raymond James Financial Inc RJF-N
Regions Financial Corp. RF-N
Rockville Financial Inc RCKB-O
Rodman & Renshaw Capital Group RODM-O
SEI Investments Company SEIC-0
Siebert Financial Corp. SIEB-O
Southern Trust Securities Holding Corp. SOHL-U
Starinvest Group Inc STIY-5
State Street Corp. STT-N
Stifel Financial Corp. SF-N
Suntrust Banks Inc STI-N
SWS Group Inc SWS-N
SY Bancorp Inc SYBT-O
TCF Financial Corp. TCB-N
TD Ameritrade Holding Corp. AMTD-O
The Goldman Sachs Group Incorporated GS-N
Tidelands Royalty Trust TIRTZ-5
Track Data Corp. TRAC-5
United Bancorp Inc Ohio UBCP-O
United Bankshares Inc UBSI-O






Table 2. The list of 42 Publicly Traded Investment Banks
# Entity Name Quote Symbol
1 Ameriprise Financial Inc AMP-N
2 Bank Of America Corp. BAC-N
3 Bank Of Hawaii Corp. BOH-N
4 Bank Of New York Mellon Corp. BK-N
5 Charles Schwab Corp. SCHW-N
6 Cigna Corp. CI-N
7 City National Corp. CYN-N
8 Comerica Inc CMA-N
9 Commerce Bancshares Inc CBSH-0
10 Community Bank System Inc CBU-N
11 Cullen Frost Bankers Inc CFR-N
12 Fifth Third Bancorp FITB-O
13 First Commonwealth Financial Corp FCF-N
14 First Horizon National Corp. FHN-N
15 First Niagara Financial Group Inc FNFG-O
16 Franklin Resources Inc BEN-N
17 Fulton Financial Corp. FULT-O
18 Greenhill & Company Inc GHL-N
19 Huntington Bancshares Inc HBAN-0
20 Intercontinental Exchange Inc ICE-N
21 Investment Technology Group ITG-N
22 Jefferies Group Inc JEF-N
23 JP Morgan Chase & Company JPM-N
24 Keycorp KEY-N
25 M & T Bank Corp. MTB-N
26 Morgan Stanley MS-N
27 Northern Trust Corp. NTRS-O
28 Peoples United Financial Inc PBCT-O
29 Piper Jaffray Companies PJC-N
30 PNC Financial Services Group Inc PNC-N
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31 Raymond James Financial Inc RJF-N
32 Regions Financial Corp. RF-N
33 SEI Investments Company SEIC-0
34 State Street Corp. STT-N
35 Stifel Financial Corp. SF-N
36 Sun trust Banks Inc STI-N
37 SWS Group Inc SWS-N
38 TCF Financial Corp. TCB-N
39 The Goldman Sachs Group Incorporated GS-N
40 Track Data Corp. TRAC-5
41 United Bankshares Inc UBSI-0
42 US Bancorp USB-N
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APPENDIX E
Table 3. ANOVA results
N F Sig.
Standard Deviation of Free Cash Flow 153 0.2680 0.6050
Standard Deviaiton of Earnings 153 1.0080 0.3150
Standard Deviation of Earnings Before Interest And Taxes 153 1.1480 0.2990
Standard Deviation of Earnings Before Taxes And 
Depreciation 153 0.6370 0.8310
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APPENDIX F 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics o f the Board of Directors Data
Independent Variable N Min Max Mean S.D.
Size of the Board 7 20 12.28 3.49
Number of Interlocks 0 31 12.11 8.84
r~-
© Voting Power 27 0.00% 33.40% 8.47% 10.90%
Stock Ownership 0.12% 42.28% 6.89% 8.02%
Independent Ratio 44.00% 92.00% 74.02% 13.33%
Size of the Board 7 20 12.20 2.90
Number of Interlocks 1 26 10.80 7.16
00
© Voting Power 42 0.00% 34.00% . 5.32% 9.16%
Stock Ownership 0.15% 37.94% 5.72% 7.81%
Independent Ratio 44.44% 92.86% 75.85% 12.20%
Size of the Board 1 17 11.72 2.58
Number of Interlocks 0 25 9.51 6.41
9 \
© Voting Power 42 0.00% 32.77% 5.14% 8.05%
Stock Ownership 0.16% 36.99% 5.44% 7.93%
Independent Ratio 50.00% 92.86% 75.21% 12.46%
Size of the Board 7 17 11.66 2.70
Number of Interlocks 0 24 8.61 6.38
©
© Voting Power 42 0.00% 89.64% 6.66% 15.08%
Stock Ownership 0.16% 36.48% 5.19% 7.60%
Independent Ratio 50.00% 94.12% 76.18% 12.58%
N = 153 observations, 42 boards of directors, four years
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APPENDIX G
Table S. Results of the Regression on the Board o f  Directors Data only
Independent Variable N Year 2007 Year 2008 Year 2009 Year 2010 Year 2011
R Square 0.1113 0.1734
Size of the Board 0.2814 -0.0339
Number of Interlocks 0.1076 0.0730oo 27M Voting Power 0.3350 -0.6804
Stock Ownership -0.2559 0.3689
Insiders Ratio 0.0159 -0.0592
R Square 0.3200 0.2418
Size of the Board -1.3516* -0.2919*
00 Number of Interlocks 1.2817 0.4359©o 42M Voting Power -0.2480 -0.4610
Stock Ownership -0.3170 0.0694
Insiders Ratio 0.1284 -0.1316*
R Square 0.2903 0.3294
Size of the Board -0.0261* -0.1995**
9s Number oflnterbcks 0.3315 0.5977OO 42M Voting Power -0.1965 -0.4973
Stock Ownership 0.0658 0.0850
Insiders Ratio -0.2179* -0.3172
R Square 0.3049 0.3282
Size of the Board -0.0389* -0.0951*
O Number oflnterbcks 0.1744 0.2689
© 42
Voting Power 0.5933 -1.0771
Stock Ownership -0.5961 0.7789
Insiders Ratio -0.4553** 0.4847
* p < .05; ** p < .01;
N = 153 observations, 42 boards of directors, four years
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APPENDIX H
Table 6. Results of the Regression (Full Model)
Independent Variable N Year 2007 Year 2008 Year 2009 Year 2010 Year 2011
R Square 0.1058 0.0976
Aspirations Past Performance -1.7963 -1.7018
Aspirations Industry Average 1.6991 1.5978
o Diversification Entropy 27 -0.0593 -0.1063o Diversification into Diversified REIT
it /
0.2596 -0.0962
Years of Diversification into Diversified REIT 0.3032 0.1061
Size of the Board 0.0893 0.1296
Insiders Ratio -0.0369 0.0562
R Square 0.1409 0.0843
Aspirations Past Performance -0.0521 -0.0348
Aspirations Industry Average 0.0782* 0.0658
00© Diversification Entropy 42 -0.1051 -0.1825*o
M Diversification into Diversified REIT
t i l
0.2963 0.1503
Years of Diversification into Diversified REIT 0.0543 0.0774
Size of the Board -0.0382* -0.0343
Insiders Ratio -0.1775* -0.2430*
R Square 0.1821 0.2341
Aspirations Past Performance 0.1517 0.1317
Aspirations Industry Average 0.3123** 0.2615*
0 \o Diversification Entropy 42 -0.1828 -0.2572*©
(N Diversification into Diversified REIT 0.1243 0.0651
Years of Diversification into Diversified REIT 0.0528 -0.0077
Size ofthe Board -0.0166* -0.1232
Insiders Ratio -0.2469* -0.3260*
R Square 0.1285 0.2044
Aspirations Past Performance 0.0237 0.6079
Aspirations Industry Average -0.1108* -0.8287
© Diversification Entropy 42 -0.1945 -0.2998*o Diversification into Diversified REIT 0.1437 0.0808
Years ofDiversifieation into Diversified REIT 0.0105 0.0407
Size ofthe Board 0.0997 0.7271
Insiders Ratio -0.2500* -1.5756*
* p < .05; ** p < .01;
N =: 153 observations, 42 boards of directors, four years
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